Personal Identity

The persistence question asks whether or not there exists a momentary awareness of ourselves as agents.

• True

• False

Answer explanation

The persistence question in philosophy asks about the conditions under which a person remains the same person over time, not whether there is a momentary awareness of oneself as an agent; it focuses on the continuity of identity across different points in time.

There are two main types of answer to the persistence question.

• True

• False

Answer explanation

In philosophy, there are two: "psychological continuity" views (based on memories and mental states) and "physical continuity" views (based on bodily continuity).

John Locke’s view of personal identity is a kind of psychological continuity view.

• True

• False

Answer explanation

Locke argued that personal identity is based on consciousness and memory, meaning that a person is the same person over time as long as they have a continuous stream of conscious experiences, which aligns with the concept of psychological continuity.

According to Locke, if our DNA always stayed the same, this would be a good answer to the persistence question.

• True

• False

Answer explanation

According to John Locke, our DNA staying the same would not be a good answer to the persistence question because he believed that personal identity is based on psychological continuity, meaning our conscious memories and experiences, not the physical matter of our bodies (including DNA), that make us who we are.

DNA could serve as a good criterion of numerical identity.

• True

• False

Answer explanation

DNA alone cannot serve as a good criterion of numerical identity because identical twins, for example, share the same DNA but are considered distinct individuals.

One of the most difficult problems for the psychological continuity account is the fission problem.

• True

• False

Answer explanation

The "fission problem" is widely considered one of the most challenging issues for the psychological continuity account of personal identity, as it presents a scenario where a single person seemingly splits into two distinct individuals, creating a paradox regarding which one is the "original" person.

The fact that we should fear torture to our body even if all of our psychological states have been transferred to a different body is supposed to provide support to the bodily continuity account of personal identity.

• True

• False

Answer explanation

The idea is that if we would still fear torture to our original body even if our mind is transferred elsewhere, it suggests that our sense of self is tied to our physical body, supporting the bodily continuity account of personal identity.

According to Locke, “person” is a forensic term.

• True

• False

Answer explanation

Locke uses "forensic" to indicate that the concept of "person" is primarily relevant in contexts where legal responsibility and moral accountability are at stake, meaning it's more about who can be praised or blamed for actions than simply a biological identity. 

Animalism is a type of bodily continuity account of personal identity.

• True

• False

Answer explanation

Animalism is considered a type of bodily continuity account of personal identity because it claims that our identity persists through time by virtue of our biological organism, essentially saying that we are identical to our human bodies and therefore our personal identity is tied to the continuity of that physical body. 

Dicephalic twins pose a problem for animalism.

• True

• False

Answer explanation

Dicephalic twins constitute a counterexample to animalism’s claim that our identity consists in our animal properties. dicephalus presents animalists with a “not-enough-bodies” problem – or, rather, a not-enough-organisms problem. The most common animalist response to dicephalic twins has been to claim that they are really two fused or overlapping organisms.