Supreme Court Judgments MCQs 2025

During the pendency of the suit concerning the suit property filed by the Respondent, an agreement to sell was knowingly entered by the Appellant with the Respondent's father making an advance payment. The Suit was decreed in favor of the Respondents, however, the Appellant claimed protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("TPA") stating that his rights over the suit property must be protected as part of part-performance of the contract. Find out the most appropriate option.

• Yes, Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act provides protection to a transferee who knowingly enters into an agreement during pending litigation, regardless of the decree holders' rights.

• No, Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be invoked by a transferee who enters into an agreement during pending litigation, especially when the transferee is aware of the litigation.

• Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act can be invoked by a transferee to obstruct the claims of decree holders, even if the transferee entered into the agreement during pending litigation.

• Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act allows a transferee to override the rights of decree holders if the transferee has paid an advance amount for the property.

Answer explanation

Case Title: RAJU NAIDU VERSUS CHENMOUGA SUNDRA & ORS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331

Explanation: The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TPA”), for a person possessing a property under part performance of a contract, is not available to a party who knowingly entered into the agreement despite being aware of pending litigation. The Court held that Section 53A TPA cannot be invoked by a transferee to obstruct or resist the claims of decree holders who have legally acquired rights over the suit property. It emphasized that a transferee who enters into a sale agreement during pending litigation, despite lacking a valid claim, cannot use this provision to override the decree holders' rights.

Whether a magistrate can direct a registration of FIR under Section 156(3) of CrPC even if the informant/complainant didn't exhaust the remedies available under Clauses (1) and (3) of Section 154 of CrPC. Find out the most appropriate option.

• A complainant can directly approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC without first filing a complaint with the police under Section 154(1) CrPC.

• A Magistrate can direct the registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC even if the complainant has not approached the police under Section 154(1) CrPC.

• A complainant must first exhaust remedies under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC before approaching a Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC.

• A complainant is not required to file any written complaint with the police before approaching a Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC.

Answer explanation

Case Title: Ranjit Singh Bath & Anr. v. Union Territory Chandigarh & Anr., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 329

Explanation: The Supreme Court has reiterated that before a complainant can seek a Magistrate's direction under Section 156(3) of the CrPC to register an FIR and investigate a cognizable offence, they must first exhaust the remedies under Sections 154(1) [Registration of FIR] and 154(3) [Complaint To SP] of the CrPC.

In a civil suit, an injunction restrained the defendant from alienating the suit property. Despite this, the defendant sold portions of it (2007–2011). The plaintiff filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC for willful disobedience. Later, the injunction was dismissed. Can the defendant be held liable for violating the order while it was in force?

• The defendant cannot be held liable for violating the injunction order because the original suit was ultimately dismissed.

• The defendant remains liable for violating the injunction order while it was in force, even if the original suit was subsequently dismissed.

• The defendant is only liable if the plaintiff can prove that the violation caused irreparable harm, regardless of the dismissal of the suit.

• The defendant is absolved of liability because the Trial Court found the property description ambiguous.

Answer explanation

Case Title: SMT LAVANYA C & ANR VERSUS VITTAL GURUDAS PAI SINCE DESEASED BY LRS. & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Explanation: The Supreme Court observed that the subsequent setting aside of an injunction order would not preclude the courts from holding the party guilty of disobedience of the committed during the pendency of the order. The Court emphasized that the disobedience of the injunction order was not erased merely because the original suit was subsequently dismissed.

In a civil suit, a decree granted the plaintiff possession of a property. The defendants later filed a Section 47 CPC application, claiming tenancy rights as bonafide cultivators over the suit property. The executing court dismissed it, stating it couldn't decide title issues under Section 47. On appeal, the defendants argued their application should be treated under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC, which permits such adjudication. Find out the most appropriate option.

• The defendants' application under Section 47 CPC cannot be treated as one under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC because the executing court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of right, title, or interest after the decree has been passed.

• The defendants' application under Section 47 CPC is valid, but the executing court cannot reclassify it as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC without the plaintiff's consent.

• The defendants' application under Section 47 CPC is invalid because they failed to raise their claim as bona fide cultivating tenants during the trial.

• The defendants' application under Section 47 CPC should be treated as one under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC because it raises questions of right, title, or interest in the property, and the executing court must reclassify the application under Section 47 under Order 21 Rule 101 CPC due to its inability to decide the questions of right, title or interest in the property after passing of the decree under Section 47 CPC.

Answer explanation

Case Details: PERIYAMMAL (DEAD THR. LRS.) AND ORS Versus V. RAJAMANI AND ANR. ETC., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293

Explanation: The Supreme Court recently observed that an application filed under Section 47 of CPC relating to the determination of questions related to the execution of the decree would be deemed as an application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 if it raises questions of right, title, or interest in the property.

A company's cheque to a creditor bounced due to insufficient funds. The creditor issued a demand notice on August 6, 2018, but the company was under an IBC moratorium from July 25, 2018. The creditor filed a Section 138 NI Act complaint against the company and its directors. The directors sought to quash the proceedings, arguing the cause of action arose after the moratorium was declared. Decide.

• The cause of action for the offence under Section 138 NI Act arises on the date the cheque is dishonored, and the moratorium does not affect the proceedings.

• The cause of action for the offence under Section 138 NI Act arises only after the expiry of 15 days from the receipt of the demand notice, and since the moratorium was already in place, the proceedings cannot be sustained.

• The cause of action for the offence under Section 138 NI Act arises when the cheque is issued, and the moratorium has no relevance to the proceedings.

• The cause of action for the offence under Section 138 NI Act arises when the creditor files the complaint, and the moratorium does not apply to criminal proceedings.

Answer explanation

Case Title: VISHNOO MITTAL VERSUS M/S SHAKTI TRADING COMPANY, Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314

Explanation: The Supreme Court has explained that the cause of action for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) arises not on the dishonour of the cheque but when the amount remains unpaid after the expiry of fifteen days following the receipt of the demand notice. Since the cause of action for S.138 NI Act offence arose after the company was subjected to a moratorium under the IBC, the Court held that the proceedings against the appellant cannot be sustained.

In an International Commercial Arbitration dispute, a contract between a Colombian (Petitioner) and an Indian (Respondent) entity had conflicting clauses—one subjecting the contract to Indian law with Gujarat courts' jurisdiction, and another requiring arbitration in Bogota under Colombian law. The Petitioner sought an arbitrator in India, while the Respondent argued for Colombian law due to the arbitration venue. Determine the most appropriate option.

• The arbitration agreement is governed by Indian law because the main contract is governed by Indian law, and there is a strong presumption in favor of the lex contractus (the law governing the main contract) when the law governing the arbitration agreement is absent.

• The arbitration agreement is governed by Colombian law because the arbitration is to be conducted in Colombia, and the award is to be governed by Colombian law.

• The arbitration agreement is invalid because the conflicting clauses in the contract cannot be harmonized.

• The arbitration agreement is governed by the law of the country where the arbitration is conducted, irrespective of the law governing the main contract.

Answer explanation

Case Title: DISORTHO S.A.S. VERSUS MERIL LIFE SCIENCES PRIVATE LIMITED, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 317

Explanation: In a significant judgment relating to International Commercial Arbitration, the Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of an express law governing the arbitration agreement, the applicable law should be determined based on the parties' intentions, with a strong presumption in favor of the law governing the main contract (lex contracts).

In a criminal trial, the Trial Court rejected an application under Section 319 CrPC to summon additional accused. The High Court set aside the trial court's decision and ordered reconsideration. After the trial concluded, the Trial Court summoned the accused in compliance with the High Court's revisional order. The Accused challenged the summoning order, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction as it had become functus officio after the conclusion of the trial. Decide.

• The Trial Court cannot reconsider a Section 319 CrPC application after the trial concludes, as it becomes functus officio.

• The Trial Court can only reconsider a Section 319 CrPC application if the prosecution files a fresh application after the trial concludes.

• The Trial Court can reconsider a Section 319 CrPC application after the trial concludes if the High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, directs it to do so, as the High Court's order relates back to the original order of the trial court rejecting the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

• The Trial Court cannot summon additional accused after the trial concludes, as it violates the principle of finality of judgments.

Answer explanation

Case Title: JAMIN & ANR. VERSUS STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 294

Explanation: In a key ruling on Section 319 of Cr.P.C., the Supreme Court held that while the power to summon an additional accused must be exercised before the trial concludes, if a pre-trial application for summoning is rejected and the High Court, in revision, sets aside the rejection and orders reconsideration, the application cannot be dismissed solely because it was heard after the trial ends. The Court ruled that it relates back to the original pre-trial rejection order.

A landlord filed an eviction suit against a tenant, claiming bona fide need of the premises to establish an ultrasound machine business for his two unemployed sons. The tenant argued that the landlord owned other properties and could have sought eviction from those instead of the premises in question. Find out the most appropriate option.

• The tenant can dictate which property the landlord should seek to evict, as the landlord owns multiple properties.

• The landlord is the best judge of which property to evict for bona fide need, and the tenant cannot oppose eviction on the grounds that the landlord owns other properties.

• The landlord must seek eviction from all properties he owns to establish bona fide need.

• The tenant can oppose eviction if the landlord's need is not genuine, regardless of the landlord's ownership of other properties.

Answer explanation

Case Title: KANAHAIYA LAL ARYA VERSUS MD. EHSHAN & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 250

Explanation: The Supreme Court observed that the landlord or property owner is the best judge of which portion of the rented premises should be vacated to meet their specific needs, and the tenant cannot oppose eviction merely on the grounds that the landlord owns other properties.

A property owner executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA) and an unregistered Agreement to Sell in favor of an agent. After the owner's death, the agent sold the property to a third party. The legal heirs of the original owner later sold the same property to another buyer, who subsequently filed a suit for possession. The agent claimed that the GPA and the Agreement to Sell gave him the authority to sell the property, even after the owner's death. Find out the most appropriate option.

• The GPA and the Agreement to Sell together create a proprietary interest in favor of the agent, making the GPA irrevocable even after the owner's death.

• The GPA becomes irrevocable upon the owner's death if it is coupled with a proprietary interest, but an unregistered Agreement to Sell does not confer any ownership rights.

• The GPA remains valid after the owner's death, and the agent can transfer ownership of the property without a registered sale deed.

• The GPA and the Agreement to Sell, even if unregistered, are sufficient to transfer ownership of the property to the agent.

Answer explanation

Case Title: M. S. ANANTHAMURTHY & ANR. VERSUS J. MANJULA ETC, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 257

Explanation: The Supreme Court ruled that a General Power of Attorney (“POA”) without an interest in favor of the agent becomes revocable upon the principal's death, terminating the agency. Additionally, even if an unregistered agreement to sell was executed alongside the POA, the agent cannot claim ownership, as an agreement to sell does not transfer title or ownership unless it is followed by a registered sale deed.

In a dispute between two banks over the priority of charge on a mortgaged property, Bank A provided a loan based on the deposit of an unregistered agreement to sell, while Bank B provided a loan based on the deposit of title deeds. Bank A claimed priority because its mortgage was created earlier in time, while Bank B argued that its mortgage, being a legal mortgage, should prevail over Bank A's equitable mortgage. Decide.

• An equitable mortgage created by the deposit of an unregistered agreement to sell prevails over a legal mortgage created by the deposit of title deeds, as it is prior in time.

• An equitable mortgage created by the deposit of an unregistered agreement to sell is invalid and cannot be enforced against any party.

• Both mortgages have equal priority, and the dispute should be resolved based on the date of creation of the mortgage.

• A legal mortgage created by the deposit of title deeds prevails over an equitable mortgage created by the deposit of an unregistered agreement to sell, even if the equitable mortgage is prior in time.

Answer explanation

Case Title: The Cosmos Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Ors., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 226

Explanation: The Supreme Court has held that a mortgage created by the deposit of an unregistered agreement to sell will be subservient to a mortgage which was created by the deposit of title deeds. This is because an agreement of sale does not by itself create any interest in or charge on any property as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.