A conveys to B a one-acre lot in fee simple, keeping the adjoining lot for himself. The recorded deed provides that the premises shall be used solely for residential purposes. A later conveys to C in fee simple and B conveys to D in fee simple. Assume the deed from A to B was duly recorded. The clause was not contained in the deeds to C and D.

C can sue D because D had constructive notice of the clause.

C can still sue D because C was a bona fide purchaser for value.

C cannot sue D as D took without actual notice.

Which of the following statements are most true of the touch and concern requirement of a valid real covenant?

Both the benefit and burden must touch and concern the land.

The promise makes the burdened land more valuable.

The burden is to the landowner as an individual.

Based upon the latest restatement, at modern law, which of the following types of privity is needed to enforce a properly recorded real covenant?

No Privity is needed for enforcement.

The most important evidence a client could provide to persuade a court that a real covenant should be terminated based on a change in circumstances is that:

There have been significant changes in the client's neighborhood itself.

The area around the client's neighborhood has significantly changed.

The person who originally sold the land was trying to prevent a certain use not intended by the client.

The growth of the area as a whole makes the real covenant impractical.

A Euclidean zoning scheme protects all of the following EXCEPT:

beautification of the community

The suburban village of Shady Acres consists almost exclusively of upscale, traditional homes. Most are Colonial, Georgian or Tudor style, and generally consist of 3,000 square feet or more. B purchases one of the last remaining vacant lots in the village and applies for a permit to build his dream home, a 3,800 square foot geodesic dome. An architectural rendering of the home resembles 2/3 of a golf ball sitting on the ground. The home does not violate height, size, or setback requirements and will cost at least as much to construct as the surrounding homes. The building commission refuses to issue a building permit, stating that it is architecturally inconsistent with the surrounding homes, is unsightly, and will decrease property values in the neighborhood. B, claiming that the home is safer, sturdier, and more ecologically friendly than traditional designs, sues to compel issuance of the permit. The permit department defends, citing the preamble to the state legislation authorizing municipalities to issue building permits: "In order to promote the safety, security and general welfare of the citizens of the state, every municipal corporation in this state is hereby authorized to require the issuance of a building permit for all new construction."

In promoting the general welfare of its citizens, the municipality may consider aesthetic considerations, among others. B's suit will fail.

Issuing a building permit is a ministerial function. If the design meets all setback requirements, the permit must issue. B will prevail.

The refusal to issue the permit when all requirements have been met constitutes a regulatory taking. The village may refuse to issue the permit, but must compensate B.

The refusal to issue the permit constitutes a regulatory taking, but since the value of the lot has increased during the litigation, B is entitled to nothing.

A Company purchases 4 parcels of land, totaling 22 acres, in an area in Euclid County, that is zoned L-3, light industrial. Among uses permitted are "metal fabrication and related industries." A is a company that builds prefabricated metal buildings. They announce plans to construct a new plant on the 22 acres. The County zoning board met and, noting that there were a large number of new residential subdivisions in the surrounding areas, and a need for new schools, rezoned one of the 4 parcels as S-2, limiting the parcel to school uses only.

The rezoning is lawful, but constitutes a taking because it destroys the legitimate, investment backed expectations of the owners of the parcels.

The rezoning is unlawful, as it is "spot zoning."

The rezoning is lawful, as it is necessary to the health and welfare of the residents of the county.

The rezoning is lawful and is not a taking because it only lowers the value of the remaining property rather than destroying it entirely.

Hardy owned several acres in the old, dilapidated downtown area of Cocoa, consisting mostly of abandoned warehouse and a few vacant lots. He delighted when the city council decided to try to revitalize the city center, restoring some of the hundred-year-old buildings and creating a mixed use development called, "Old Town," combining a variety of boutique shops, restaurants, and related businesses with small townhouse developments. Hardy prepared a subdivision of his various parcel, filed a subdivision map showing commercial lots, obtained all the necessary approvals, and began selling commercial-sized lots to merchants and businesspersons eager to join the prosperity of the new "Old Town" development. Each of the deeds conveying lots sold by Hardy contained the following: "It is hereby covenanted by the seller that the property conveyed shall be used for commercial or residential purposes only, that no industrial, warehouse, or other manufacturing structures shall be erected or maintained thereon, and that this covenant shall bind the buyer, his heirs and assigns, and their successors." Although the lots did not sell as rapidly as Hardy had hoped, he mad regular sales as the new downtown area gradually filled in and become widely publicized in the greater metropolitan area. Two years after he had first subdivided, two of the new lots remained unsold, a little over two acres. Because he was experiencing cash flow problems in his other enterprises, Hardy was forced to raise funds immediately, and sold the remaining two lots to Development Properties, Inc. (DPI), a real estate speculation firm. The deed to DPI did not contain any language restricting the use of the property. DPI then sold the property to a giant supermarket chain, which intended to construct a warehouse and distribution center for its retail operations in the western states. The warehouse would involve the constant movement in and out of large trucks 24 hours per day, seven days a week. Suzzie, who had purchased a lot from Milt that was located next to the proposed warehouse, operated a coffee shop specializing in reggae entertainment and poetry readings. She brings a suit against the supermarket chain seeking to enjoin construction of the warehouse. Her attorney argues that the lots sold by Hardy to DPI and then to the supermarket chain are bound by the same restrictions on use that are contained in the deed by which Suzzie took her property.

Suzzie will win is she can show that Hardy established a common development scheme for this entire subdivision.

Suzzie will win unless DPI and the supermarket were not aware of the restriction when they purchased the property.

Suzzie will lose because the restriction in her deed binds only the purchaser of the land.

Suzzie will lose because the deed by which DPI took the property from Hardy did not contain the restrictions on use.

A deed reciting that A conveys Blackacre to B "for no consideration whatsoever" is

valid, as a deed is not a covenant and requires no consideration.

invalid, since there is no consideration.

valid as between the parties, but not recordable since it does not state value for tax purposes.

invalid as a conveyance to defraud creditors.

a seller must disclose all defects noticeable or not.

a seller must disclose only those defects readily observable by a potential buyer.

a seller need not disclose defects, if a buyer is having an inspection done.

a seller has no obligation to disclose defects.

In the late 1980s, O, a well-known vintner, divided his massive vineyard into two parcels, Grapeacre and Vineacre. The vineyard had been irrigated with the water from a single well. When he subdivided the property he purposely drew the boundaries so that the well fell on the border of the two properties. O then conveyed Grapeacre to M by a deed that contained the following covenant: "If the well located on the boundary of Grapeacre and Vineacre continues to be used for irrigation purposes and becomes in need of repair or replacement, the grantee, his heirs, and assigns and the grantor, his heirs, and assigns each promise to pay one-half of the cost of such repair or replacement. This covenant shall run with the land." The deed from O to M was not recorded, and O did not record a copy with the records for Vineacre. M later sold Grapeacre to S, S's deed did not contain the covenant about the well. After many years of use by the owners of both Grapeacre and Vineacre, the well began to fail. S took in upon himself to have the well repaired. He accepted the lowest bid on the job, which was $30,000. About two weeks later, he was rummaging through the files at his winery and discovered the deed from O to M. By this time, Vineacre had passed to O's son E by inheritance, and again to E's son J by inheritance from the now-deceased E. J knew nothing of the covenant concerning the well. S presented J with the bill for the well repair with a copy of the O/M deed and a note that said he expected to be reimbursed for $15,000. J refused to pay, and S sued. The jurisdiction has a 10-year statute of limitations for acquiring property by adverse possession, and the following recording statute: "Any conveyance of interest in land shall not be valid against any subsequent purchaser for value, without notice thereof, unless the conveyance is first recorded." The court is most likely to rule in favor of:

S, because the covenant runs with the land.

J, because the deed from O to M was never recorded.

J, because S had acquired the well by adverse possession.

S, because he is a bona fide purchaser without notice.

Developer D created an exclusive residential subdivision, Woodlake. In his deed to each lot, the following language appeared: "Grantee agrees for himself and assigns to use this property solely as a single family residence, to pay monthly fees as levied by Woodlake Homeowners' Association for upkeep and security guard services, and to keep the backyard of this property unfenced so that bicycle paths and walkways may run through each backyard, as per the Woodlake master plan [adequately described], for use by all residents of Woodlake." D sold lots to A, B, and C. All deeds were recorded. A in turn sold to E by deed that omitted any mention of the foregoing covenants, and E had no actual knowledge thereof. Shortly thereafter, E started operating a commercial swimming pool sales operation out of his home. B in turn sold to F, who knew of but refused to pay the monthly fees levied by the homeowners' association. C leased her property for 10 years to G, who erected a fence around the backyard, unaware of the covenant against such fencing. If F sues G to remove his backyard fence:

F should win because the deed language about fencing created an equitable servitude enforceable against G.

G should win because he erected the fence in good faith and without actual knowledge of the restrictions.

F should win because F is in vertical privity with B.

G should win because there is no privity between B and G.

A purchaser wished to construct an industrial complex. On August 15, a seller and the purchaser entered into a written agreement that provided, among other things, as follows: "The seller hereby agrees to sell the seller's unimproved property consisting of 40 acres to the purchaser for the price of $400,000. The seller shall convey good and marketable title. Closing of escrow is to occur no later than December 1. This agreement will be null and void if the purchaser is not the owner of, and does not hold legal title to, the subject property on December 1." On October 20, the seller discovered a 20-year-old easement running through the center of the property that a former owner had granted to the city when a mass transit rail line had been in the planning stages. The rail system had been abandoned when voters refused to support an increase in a local tax to finance construction. The seller immediately notified the purchaser of the easement and that she had begun negotiations with the city manager and the city planning commission to repurchase the easement and thereby extinguish it. On November 20, the purchaser telephoned the seller and asked about progress on the easement repurchase. The seller stated that a few holdovers on the planning commission were arguing to retain the easement, but that she had the votes to swing the commission her way, given enough time. "Do your best," was the purchaser's only response. Due to the Thanksgiving holiday, the planning commission did not vote on the easement repurchase issue until November 30, but voted to sell the easement back to the seller. The city manager's office could not process the paperwork necessary to effectuate the sale of easement rights to the seller until December 2, on which day the seller deposited into escrow a warranty deed conveying good and marketable title to the subject property to the purchaser. The purchaser refused to pay the purchase price and declared that the contract had been rescinded. The seller sought specific performance in an appropriate legal action. Assuming the seller prevails, which of the following is the best support for the court's decision?

The purchaser led the seller to believe that strict adherence to the time of the essence clause would not be insisted upon.

Time was not of the essence in the agreement between the seller and the purchaser.

Delayed performance can never be considered a total breach of a land sale contract.

The purchaser would be unjustly enriched if permitted to rely upon one day's delay in performance as justification for rescinding the contract.

In order to evade the IRS and his creditors, a landowner transferred title to his property to his good friend. The two men had a verbal agreement that when the landowner's financial problems were settled, the good friend would convey the property back to the landowner. The friend put the deed in his safe. The landowner was sentenced to a prison term for IRS violations. Several years later, he was released from prison. When he arrived at the friend's house, he discovered that the friend had died about a month earlier. The friend had never told his wife about his deal with the landowner. By the time the landowner arrived, the friend's wife had discovered the deed and included it in the inventory of property submitted to the probate court. Because she knew that the landowner and her husband were good friends and that her husband would have wanted the landowner to have the property, she returned the deed and deleted it from the probate inventory. The friend's creditors became suspicious and filed suit to have the property declared part of the estate. Which of the following statements is most accurate?

The property is part of the estate, because the friend is presumed to have accepted the deed, and it was not properly conveyed back to the landowner.

The property belongs to the landowner, because the friend did not formally accept title.

The property belongs to the landowner, because the friend was not a bona fide purchaser.

The property is part of the estate, but after probate the land will revert back to the original landowner because of their verbal agreement.

A geologist, owner in fee simple of a quarry, had substantial gambling debts. In an effort to placate her creditors, she gave them mortgages to the quarry. Eventually, the total of the mortgages was greater than the fair market value of the property. When the creditors started sending intimidating representatives to "inquire" as to the condition of the quarry, the geologist decided that the best course of action was to sell the property. The geologist entered into a purchase and sale agreement with a buyer. The buyer made a significant down payment. The agreement called for the geologist to convey marketable title to the buyer on a specific date. On the closing date, the buyer refused to complete the sale. He said the mortgages made the title unmarketable. The geologist refused to return the down payment. In truth, she had failed to put the money in escrow and had spent it at the casinos. The geologist's only asset was the quarry. Both parties filed suit: the geologist for specific performance, and the buyer for return of his down payment.

The geologist will not obtain specific performance, and the buyer's down payment will be refunded to him.

The geologist will obtain specific performance, and the buyer's down payment will not be refunded to him.

The geologist will obtain specific performance, and the buyer's down payment will be refunded to him.

The geologist will not obtain specific performance, and the buyer's down payment will not be refunded to him.

A homeowner listed her home for sale with an asking price of $325,000. She received a written offer of $315,000 from an out-of-state couple who were moving to the area due to the husband's promotion and transfer. When the offer was made in November, the husband had seen the property but the wife had only viewed it via a computer-based "virtual on-line tour." A valid written contract of sale was signed on November 15 with settlement scheduled for January 1. The wife came to see the property in December. She was delighted with the home, and she was particularly impressed with the beautiful custom draperies, which were not listed as "inclusions" in the agreement of sale. She asked the owner if the drapes were negotiable. The owner agreed to leave them if she would receive her original asking price of $325,000. The wife agreed. On January 1, settlement day, the couple tendered a check for $315,000. The homeowner refused to settle, claiming that the purchase price was $325,000. Which of the following is accurate?

The homeowner must execute the contract for $315,000.

The homeowner must execute the contract for $325,000 and leave the drapes.

The homeowner must execute the contract for $315,000 and leave the drapes.

The homeowner may rescind the contract.

E conveyed all of her property to S except for one landlocked parcel. E uses a path across S's land to reach her parcel, and does so for 8 years. The statute of limitations for actions involving title to real estate is ten years. S conveys his property to A. E continues to access her parcel along the path for four more years when A brings an action in trespass.

E has an easement by necessity.

E has acquired a prescriptive easement by adverse possession.

E prevails only if she was using the path without S's permission.

A prevails because the statute did not begin to run until she acquired the property.

E owned Hillacre, a ten acre tract of vacant land adjacent to Grassacre as investment property. Hillacre and Grassacre both have access to Mainroad. In 1979, S, owner of Grassacre began to use a portion of Hillacre as a road for ingress and egress. He would have sought permission, but had no idea who owned the land. S used this road daily until 1995. The statute of limitations for enforcing interests in land in the jurisdiction is 20 years. In 1995, S sold Grassacre by General Warranty Deed to B for $500,000. B continued to use the road across Hillacre. In 2005, E died leaving Hillacre to A. A decided to build on Hillacre and comes to you for advice about B's use of the road.

B has acquired an easement by prescription.

B has acquired an easement by necessity.

B has no right to use the road.

B has an easement by implication.

The recording statue in the state of Crimson reads in relevant part: Any conveyance of an estate in land, other than a lease for less than one year, shall not be valid against any subsequent purchaser for value, without notice, unless the conveyance is recorded. Oli owned Horseacre, which was located in the state of Crimson. Oli sold Horseacre to Ariel for $100,000. Ariel put the deed in her desk drawer without recording it and left for an extended sojourn in Nepal. Oli, aware of Ariel's departure and seeing an opportunity to make a quick profit, partitioned Hourseacre and sold the front half, Frontacre, to Tamarind in exchange for $50,000. Tamarind, who knew nothing of Ariel's interest in the property, promptly recorded his interest. Two months later, Tamarind found a job in another city and sold Frontacre to Conch in exchange for $55,000. Conch was acquainted with Ariel and was aware of her interest in the property but did not believe that she would return from Nepal anytime soon. Conch promptly recorded her deed to Frontacre. Meanwhile, Oli incurred substantial gambling debts and was in need of immediate funds, so he executed a mortgage on the back half of Horseacre that he had retained (Backacre) to Bella Savings and Loan in the amount of $40,000. Bella knew nothing of Oli's transaction with Ariel but neglected to record its mortgage interest. Six months later, Ariel returned from Nepal and recorded her deed to Horseacre. If Ariel brings an action to quiet title in Horseacre, which of the following statements is most accurate?

Ariel's claim to Horseacre is superior to Oli's rights to Backacre, inferior to Conch's rights in Frontacre, and subject to Bella's mortgage in Backacre

Ariel's claim to Horseacre is superior to Oli's rights in Backacre and Conch's rights in Frontacre, and not subject to Bella's mortgage in Backacre.

Ariel's claim to Horseacre is superior to Oli's rights in Backacre, inferior to Conch's rights in Frontacre, and not subject to Bella's mortgage in Backacre.

Ariel's claim to Horseacre is superior to Oli's rights in Backacre and Conch's rights in Frontacre, but subject to Bella's mortgage in Backacre

Townacre is located in the state of Vermillion, which has a statutory adverse possession period of 15 years. Olive purchased Townacre in 1965. It was a suburban property containing a single-family dwelling, which Olive made her home. Immediately adjoining Townacre was a five-foot wide strip, which was a private right-of-way. When Olive took possession of Townacre in 1965, she was not aware where the exact boundaries of her property were located. Therefore, when she planted a garden and enclosed it with a wire fence two weeks after taking up occupancy, the five-foot right-of-way strip was included within the bounds of the fence. Olive maintained the fence and garden until 1985, at which time she was time she tired of gardening chores and took up golfing as a hobby instead. When she gave up gardening, Olive also removed the fence and smoothed out the ground where the garden had been located. In 1990, Olive would enter into a written contract to sell Townacre to Beck. The written description in the contract included the five-foot strip. After research into the county recorder's office, Beck discovered that the strip was a private right-of-way when Olive purchased Townacre. After properly notifying Olive of the problem prior to closing, Beck refused to tender the purchase money to Olive when the closing day arrived. Olive sued Beck for specific performance of the real estate sales contract.

Beck, because Olive failed to provide marketable title.

Beck, because Olive surrendered her adverse possession rights when she removed the fence, because her possession was not longer open, notorious, and continuous.

Beck, because one may not adversely possess a right-of-way.

Olive, because she held the right-of-way for a longer time than the minimum required by the state adverse possession statute.'

Rupert's uncle decided, as a surprise birthday present, to give Rupert a beach house which Rupert had visited often and expressed his great admiration for. The uncle's attorney prepared and the uncle validly executed a deed conveying the property to Rupert, and the attorney then validly recorded the deed. Unknown to the uncle, Rupert was experiencing severe financial difficulty and was contemplating filing for bankruptcy. When Rupert learned of the recordation of the deed at his birthday party, he immediately told his uncle that he did not want the beach house and could not accept such an expensive gift anyway. Later, Rupert filed for bankruptcy and the trustee in the bankruptcy asserted an ownership interest in the beach property on behalf of the debtor's estate. The bankruptcy court ruled that the property belonged to Rupert's uncle and not to Rupert, and thus was not part of the debtor's estate subject to distribution.

There was never an effective acceptance of the delivery of the deed by Rupert.

There was no presumption of delivery created by recordation of the deed because Rupert did not know of recordation.

Rupert's statements to his uncle at the birthday party were constructive reconveyance of the property.

The recordation of the deed was invalid because done without Rupert's permission.

A cowboy owned a 200-acre ranch in fee simple. After working the land for 40 years, the cowboy conveyed it by quitclaim deed to two lawyers--an associate and a partner--as tenants in common for $1.2 million. Ironically, the lawyers failed to record the deed. They also failed to agree on the use of the land, and the associate conveyed her one-half interest in it to an investor by a properly recorded special warranty deed duly. Soon thereafter, the cowboy approached a real estate corporation and bargained to sell the ranch (again) for $800,000, its current fair market value in a depressed market. In exchange for the purchase price, the cowboy presented the corporation with a general warranty deed, which the corporation duly recorded. The relevant recording statute states: "Every conveyance of real property, other than a lease for a term not to exceed one year, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property or any part thereof in good faith and for valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded." The jurisdiction also uses grantor-grantee and grantee-grantor indexes. In a suit to quiet title, who is likely to prevail?

The corporation, because it cannot be charged with constructive knowledge of the associate-investor deed.

The partner and the investor, because the corporation can be charged with inquiry notice of the investor's interest in the ranch.

B The investor, because the property is located in a race-notice jurisdiction.

The corporation, because it can be charged with constructive knowledge of the associate-investor deed.

A young college student was frequently invited by her professor to spend holidays at the remote mountain property owned by the professor's elderly uncle. One day, when the uncle complained of no longer being able to properly care for the property, the student offered to buy it. The uncle agreed, and in exchange for its market value, delivered a warranty deed conveying the property to the student. Alas, the student failed to record her deed. Two months later, the uncle, his mind slipping, purported to convey the property via warranty deed to the professor as a wedding present. The professor immediately recorded her deed. When the student subsequently learned of the professor-uncle deed, she immediately recorded her deed and then brought an action to quiet title to the property. The applicable recording act provides, "A conveyance of an estate in land (other than a lease for less than one year) shall not be valid as against any subsequent purchaser for value, except such person who has actual notice of it, unless the conveyance is properly recorded."

Yes, because she took the property first in time.

Yes, because she recorded her deed before commencing the quiet title action.

No, because the professor is considered to have actual knowledge of the student's interest via imputation from the donor, her uncle.

No, because she did not record before the uncle conveyed the property to the professor.

A conveys Blackacre to "B for so long as he may choose to live on the property." Today, this would create:

a tenancy at will terminable by either party.

38. L leases an apartment to T for one year, at a rent of $700/month.

If T abandons the premises, L has a duty to mitigate rent due by trying to re-rent.

If T fails to pay rent, L may evict him, and T will not be liable for any further rent.

L leases Whiteacre to T for one year. L fails to provide heat during the winter, or air conditioning during the summer.

T can likely withhold rent for the winter months for breach of warranty of habitability or as a constructive eviction.

T can likely withhold rent for both winter and summer as a constructive eviction.

O leases a warehouse in Cleveland, Ohio, to A. The lease is for a term of three years. When O seeks to take possession, he notices that C, the prior tenant, has not vacated the premises. He then withholds further rent. O sues for the rent.

The suit succeeds, because under the American rule the landlord has no duty to deliver possession of leased premises.

The suit fails, because the landlord has a duty to deliver possession of leased premises.

The suit succeeds only if A has asked the holdover tenant to leave and he has refused to do so.

The suit fails because it would be a windfall to O to collect rent from two tenants, and it is presumed that he is receiving rent from C.

A conveys Blackacre to "B for so long as he may choose to live on the property." Today, this conveyance would create:

a life estate in B, reversion in A.

an estate for a term of years, remainder in A.

a tenancy at will terminable by either party.

A leases a restaurant to B for a term of 10 years. The restaurant is successful, but after 5 years B wishes to retire. He has a buyer for the restaurant business, and the buyer is willing to assume B's obligations under the lease. The lease contains the following language: The lease may not be assigned nor the premises sublet without the written consent of the landlord. C, the buyer, wants to operate an upscale restaurant featuring middle eastern cuisine. He operates two other highly acclaimed middle eastern restaurants in the area. A refuses to permit C to assume the lease.

The restriction is valid, but the implied obligation of good faith in contracts requires that consent not be unreasonably withheld.

The lease provision is void as a naked restraint on alienation.

The refusal, apparently based on C's ethnicity, is against public policy and a court of equity would order A to accept assignment of the lease.

A is the owner of a warehouse on 6th avenue. B will lease the warehouse at a rental of $1,000 per month for two years. They shake hands on the deal. After paying the rental for five months, B sends a letter to A explaining that the warehouse was not large enough for his expanding business and he was vacating the premises. The letter included a check for $1,000 for the next month's rent. A does not cash the check, since it includes the notation "rental in full." At the end of the month, B sent the keys to A by messenger and vacated the building. The warehouse remains vacant for eighteen months, and A has now sued B for $18,000, the remaining rental due under the terms of the lease. Group of answer choices

A recovers nothing, since the tenancy actually created was a month-to-month tenancy.

A does not prevail because he did not take steps to mitigate his damages.

A prevails, but his damages are reduced by the amount that he could have received in rents if he had taken reasonable steps to mitigate his damages.

A recovers the entire rental since a landlord has no duty to mitigate damages under a lease for a specified term.

Under the common law, the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment:

may be waived only by tenant and landlord together.

may be waived by landlord alone with notice to tenant.

The city of Orlando needs land to expand a high school. In order to obtain the land, they plan to condemn 100 homes in a subdivision adjacent to the current school. In order to effect this condemnation:

The city must show a public purpose for the land.

The city must show the homes are dangerous for habitation.

The city must show that no alternative vacant land is available.

A is the owner of a waterfront home that is protected by a seawall. He owns all of the land to the mean low tide line, which is ten feet seaward of the seawall. The Army Corps of Engineers places a navigational marker on the seawall that is a red diamond-shaped sign about three feet high. The top of the marker is one foot below the top of the seawall, and the bottom of the marker is three feet above the bottom of the wall. The marker is not visible from the house, but is visible to boats on the water. A sues the government, claiming that his property has been taken without compensation. The army responds that the law requires the Corps of Engineers to place and maintain navigational markings and that there has been minimal damage, if any, to the real estate.

As there has been physical invasion, there has been a taking even if the loss in value is minimal.

Because of the nominal damage, there has been no compensable taking.

Because the corps of engineers was operating under a legal mandate, there has been no taking.

The public trust doctrine requires all landowners who live on navigable waterways to permit navigational markers to be placed on their property.

The city of New Freshland wants to rebuild an older portion of the city to reflect its modern image and amenities. In order to condemn the privately owned buildings presently on the land, under Kelo:

the city may sell the land to private developers who will profit from the development.

the city must show that the buildings constitute blight.

the city may employ private developers but must maintain city ownership of the land.

A had rented B's home from her for seven years. When the time came to sign a new lease, B decided that since A had always been a reliable and quiet tenant, she would continue to charge him only $350 per month rent instead of the $500 to $550 she could probably get otherwise. The new lease was for a period of five years, and by its terms, A was specifically prohibited from assigning the lease without B's written consent. About a year later, A got married and moved into his new wife's home. Instead of giving up his lease with B, A sublet the property to C for $500 per month. A did not get B's permission to sublease the property. If B brings an action to either eject C or to recover damages from A for subletting without her consent, B most likely would:

Be able to recover damages and/or to eject C.

Be able to eject C only, because she has suffered no money damages.

Not be able to eject C because A had the power to sublet, but she will be able to recover the full rent paid by C because it would be unfair to let B profit from his wrongdoing.

Neither be able to eject C nor to recover damages.

On March 20, 2008, A replied to an advertisement from B to rent B's vacation home in southern Virginia for the two-year period from June 1, 2006, to May 31, 2008. Eager to enjoy the home, A drove across the country with his family to begin their vacation. To A's surprise, when they arrived on June 4, 2006, the house was occupied by C, a holdover tenant who refuses to leave. Under the "English Rule," which applies in this jurisdiction:

B is responsible for providing physical as well as legal possession, so B must evict C.

A will prevail in a suit against C, which he must bring to secure possession.

C will prevail against A since he was "first in time".

B can chose to rescind the lease based upon mutual mistake of fact.

Property Law Covenants Worksheet

Authored by susan fajardo

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MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION

30 sec • 1 pt

A owns Blackacre. A decides to subdivide Blackacre and sell off the middle portion to B, retaining the property on the eastern side of B as well as that on the western side of B's new land. The original property is bordered on the east by a highway and on the southeastern border by a lake. A wants to continue his access to both of these areas from his home west of B's land, rather than having to drive around the northern border which is a much longer route. B agrees, but in exchange. A promises B that he will fix D's boat which is docked near B's property. These covenants are recorded on the respective deeds. A later sells the land to C. Which of the following is true regarding whether B can enforce the boat repair covenant against C.

B cannot enforce the promise against C.

B can enforce the promise against C as an equitable servitude.

B can enforce the promise against C as a real covenant that runs with the land.

None of the above স্তর

MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION

30 sec • 1 pt

A requirement to maintain property can be enforced through successive owners:

through a real covenant that runs with the land.

through a license.

It cannot be enforced.

All of the above.

MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION

30 sec • 1 pt

O, owner of a four acre parcel divided and conveyed two acres to A, keeping the other two acres for herself. The deed, properly recorded, includes mutual covenants by O, her heirs and assigns, and by A her heirs and assigns, that both the conveyed and retained properties will be used for residential purposes only. If O conveys the retained parcel to B for valuable consideration, which of the following is most accurate?

B is bound by the restrictive covenant.

B is not bound by the restrictive covenant, because there was no horizontal privity of estate.

B is not bound by the restriction, because there was no vertical privity of estate.

B is only bound by the restriction if A, in fact, used her property for residential purposes.

MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION

30 sec • 1 pt

O, owner of a four acre parcel divided and conveyed two acres to A, keeping the other two acres for herself. The deed, properly recorded, includes mutual covenants by O, her heirs and assigns, and by A her heirs and assigns, that both the conveyed and retained properties will be used for residential purposes only. If B takes A's property by adverse possession, which of the following is most accurate?

B is not bound by the restriction because there was no vertical privity of estate.

B is bound by the restrictive covenant.

B is not bound by the restrictive covenant because there was no horizontal privity of estate.

B is only bound if O, in fact, used her land for residential purposes.

MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION

30 sec • 1 pt

A conveys to B a one-acre lot in fee simple, keeping the adjoining lot for himself. The recorded deed provides that the premises shall be used solely for residential purposes. The deed provision is:

a private encumbrance.

a public encumbrance.

not an encumbrance.

an encumbrance binding on B, but not binding on B’s successors or assignees.

MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION

30 sec • 1 pt

A conveys to B a one-acre lot in fee simple, keeping the adjoining lot for himself. The recorded deed provides that the premises shall be used solely for residential purposes. A conveys his lot to C in fee simple. B conveys his lot to D in fee simple. Both deeds contain the clause in the original deed from A to B. If D builds a law office out of his house on the lot:

C can sue D for damages.

C cannot sue D for damages as they are not in privity.

C cannot sue D for damages as the law office does not touch and concern the land.

C would have to rely on a zoning regulation for damages.

MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION

30 sec • 1 pt

All homes in the Shadyacres development are set back 50 feet from the main road. The original deeds contained notice of the restriction.

A subsequent purchaser will be deemed to have notice of the restriction even if it is not contained in the subsequent deed.

A subsequent purchaser will not be deemed to have notice of the restriction if it is not contained in the subsequent deed.

Notice will be assumed based on other construction in the neighborhood.

None of the above

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