The March on Rome

The March on Rome

• Mussolini launched himself into further negotiations with the Liberal factions, discussing which cabinet posts should be allocated to the Fascists.

• He did not disclose that his real ambition was to be Prime Minister. At the same time he was talking to the Fascist squads about organising a coup d’état. In fact, he was under great pressure to adopt such a policy – many Fascists had wanted to try to seize power at the end of the abortive general strike and it had taken all of Mussolini’s authority to dissuade them.

• He believed that he could achieve power without a coup, but by considering such action he could keep his more radical supporters happy, and intimidate the Liberals into making concessions.

• At the beginning of October Mussolini increased the pressure by starting to organise a Fascist march on Rome.

• The Fascist squads were organised into a militia and plans were drawn up to seize the major towns and cities of northern and central Italy.

• Around 30,000 Fascists would then converge on the capital and install themselves in power. If they met resistance they would crush it.

• Many Fascists genuinely believed that their coup was finally at hand. However, their leader saw the march as his ultimate piece of political blackmail.

• Mussolini seems to have been convinced that, under such a threat, the politicians would agree that he should become Prime Minister.

• While going ahead with preparations for the march, Mussolini took care to reassure the establishment that they need not fear a Fascist government. In particular, he stressed that Fascism and the monarchy could work together, as the following speech, which he made at Naples on the eve of the march, makes clear.

Mussolini

" There is no doubt that the unity of Italy is soundly based on the House of Savoy [the royal family]. There is equally no doubt that the Italian monarchy cannot put itself in opposition to the new national forces. It did not manifest any opposition when the Italian people asked and obtained their country’s participation in the war. Would it then have reason to be in opposition today, when Fascismo does not intend to attack the regime, but rather to free it from all those superstructures that overshadow its historical position and limit the expansion of the national spirit? The parliament and all the paraphernalia of democracy have nothing in common with the monarchy. Not only this, but neither do we want to take away the people’s toy – the parliament. We say ‘toy’ because a great part of the people seem to see it this way. Can you tell me else why, out of 11 million voters, six million do not trouble themselves to vote? But we will not take it away. " 

• Mussolini realised that the attitude of the King was critical. As commander-in-chief he could order the army to crush Fascism if he so wished.

• By the last week of October preparations were complete. On the night of the 27th, Fascist squads seized town halls, telephone exchanges and railway stations throughout northern Italy. In the early hours of 28 October the government of Luigi Facta finally found the courage to act, and persuaded the King to agree to the declaration of a state of siege.

• Police and troops prepared to disperse the Fascist gangs converging on Rome by road and rail.

• However, by 9 am King Victor Emmanuel had changed his mind. He now refused to authorise the declaration of martial law that would have sanctioned the use of force against the Fascists. This would prove to be a fateful decision: it was a sign that the King lacked confidence in his government and was anxious to avoid a violent showdown with Mussolini’s Fascists.

• It is still uncertain why Victor Emmanuel made this decision – he may have over-estimated the number of Fascists marching on Rome and feared a civil war; he may have feared that his cousin, the Duke of Aosta, a known Fascist sympathiser, was waiting to depose him if he acted against Mussolini.

• Probably more plausibly, the King had little love for the existing Liberal politicians and, believing Mussolini’s protestations of loyalty, considered that Fascists should be brought into the governing coalition.

• Their nationalism, their anti-Socialism and their energy might breathe new life into the regime. Victor Emmanuel certainly did not realise that his decision would open the way for a Fascist dictatorship.

• On hearing of the King’s refusal to declare martial law, Facta’s government resigned. Victor Emmanuel then approached Salandra, a veteran conservative Liberal, and asked him to form a new government.

• Salandra attempted to negotiate with the Fascists, offering them a few cabinet posts, but it soon became apparent that Mussolini would accept nothing less than the post of Prime Minister for himself.

• With other Liberal leaders also opposed to a Salandra premiership – a sign of the continuing faction-fighting – the King realised that he needed to find a different man to head the government. In the apparent absence of any other viable candidate Benito Mussolini was asked, on 29 October, to become Prime Minister of Italy.