What is the percentage change in union density in the base and the final periods? (Ignore the percent sign in your answer)
2156 - Midterm 2 Review

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Social Studies
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University
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Medium

Phuong Vu
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15 questions
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1.
FILL IN THE BLANK QUESTION
2 mins • 1 pt
2.
FILL IN THE BLANK QUESTION
2 mins • 1 pt
What is the percentage change in union density due to structural change in the composition of employment? (Ignore the percent sign in your answer)
3.
MATCH QUESTION
2 mins • 1 pt
Match the following four axioms of the Nash's bargaining solution with their definitions:
Symmetry
Only Pareto-efficient bargains will be agreed to.
Transformation invariance
If the parties chose outcome A from all the alternatives in the set S, then the same outcome should be chosen from the set T, which is a subset of S.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives
The solution is NOT altered by linear transformations of the utility function of either party.
Pareto efficiency
If the feasible bargaining, S, is symmetric, the solution will give equal utility increments to both parties.
4.
MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION
1 min • 1 pt
Following are the activities that attempt to alter the constraint focus on the product market EXCEPT:
Opposition to regulation
Support for quotas, tariffs, and other restrictions on foreign competition
Advertising of the product by attaching a union label on the product
Attempting to organize all the firms in an industry
5.
MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION
1 min • 1 pt
The contract curve is the locus of the Pareto-efficient (or Pareto-optimal) wage-employment outcomes, which are characterized by the points where the union's indifference curve being tangent to the firm's isoprofit curve.
TRUE
FALSE
6.
MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION
1 min • 1 pt
The isoprofit curve and the demand for labour curve intersect at the maximum point of the demand for labour curve.
TRUE
FALSE
7.
FILL IN THE BLANK QUESTION
3 mins • 1 pt
Mary and Jane have $200 to share. In the first bargaining round, Mary will propose how to share this sum, and Jane can either accept or reject Mary's proposal. If an agreement is not reached in the first round, there will be $175 to share in round 2 when Jane will propose how to share this sum, and Mary can either accept or reject Jane's proposal. If an agreement is not reached in round 2, each player will receive $50. According to Rubinstein's bargaining model, in the bargaining solution, Mary will propose that she would get how many dollars out of $200 in the first round. Ignore the dollar sign in your answer.
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