IR 101_2_section 19

What are two "realist" dynamics that can lead to war according to the text book?

• interests of subnational influential group

• preventive motive

• security dilemma

• misperception

A strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risk of accidental war, with the hope that the other will "blink"(lose its nerve) first and make concessions

What is true if the status quo agreement is at point a?

• Any movement within the qba triangle is positive-sum.

• Any movement along the line segment ab is zero-sum.

• Agreement within triangle qba is likely.

• Actor A will improve its share by making an agreement that is closer to point b.

Two states have a disagreement over territory along their shared border, and the larger, more powerful state sends in its military in order to occupy the disputed territory. In part they are able to accomplish this because there is no international organization that can credibly threaten to prevent them from doing so. This is an example of

• free riding

• cooperation

• sovereignty

• anarchy

The condition of being dragged into an unwanted war because of the opportunistic actions of an ally

A strategy in which states join forces with the stronger side in a conflict

Which of the following is an example of a public good?

• a free lunch provided by a soup kitchen

• the clean air resulting from laws reducing pollution

• a tariff protecting an important national industry

•   electric cars that reduce smog for everyone

    Which of the following is an example of linkage?

• You and your neighbor agree to take turns shoveling your driveways on snow days.

• You agree to drive your little brother to school, and your older brother agrees to do the dishes when it is your turn.

• Your friend doesn’t share his lunch with you, so you refuse to share yours the next day.

• The president of the United States enacts tariffs on steel so the Chinese premier also enacts tariffs on steel.

Below is an example of which game?

• Chicken

• Stag Hunt

• Prisoner’s Dilemma

• Cooperation

The most likely outcome for both participants in the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that

• both keep quiet so that both go free.

• both provide evidence against the other and go to jail.

• one prisoner keeps quiet, while the other provides evidence and avoids jail.

• both keep quiet and spend time in jail.