Rule 67

​Rule 67, Expropriation

By Edmar Lerios

Expropriation under Rule 67 is how the State actually enforces its power of eminent domain. Eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. Expropriation is the special civil action that implements that right in court. Think of eminent domain as the power, and expropriation as the judicial proceeding that uses that power. Because it is an involuntary sale, the landowner is practically an unwilling seller; provided that public use and just compensation are present, a private individual cannot legally resist, although the government may always choose a negotiated sale instead of litigation.

The Constitution in Article III, section 9 allows the State to take private property for public use, but only upon payment of just compensation. Rule 67 gives the procedural safeguards so that due process is observed and compensation is properly fixed. The complaint must be verified, must clearly state the plaintiff’s right to expropriate and the public purpose, must describe the property, and must join as defendants all persons owning, claiming to own, or occupying any part or interest in the property, so the court can determine who is entitled to compensation. If the plaintiff cannot accurately identify the real owners, this fact must be alleged, but those with lawful interests still have the right to intervene or, in some cases, to sue separately for damages.

Multiple Choice

Which statement best explains the relationship between eminent domain and expropriation under Philippine remedial and constitutional law doctrine?

• Eminent domain is the inherent State power; expropriation is the judicial proceeding that enforces that power through Rule sixty seven.

• Expropriation is the inherent State power; eminent domain is the judicial proceeding that enforces that power through Rule sixty seven.

• Eminent domain and expropriation both mean payment; the terms are interchangeable and impose no special rules under Rule sixty seven.

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly reflects the essential allegations and joinder requirements in a verified complaint for expropriation under Rule sixty seven?

• The expropriation complaint must allege plaintiff’s right, describe the property, and join all persons owning, claiming, or occupying any interest.

• The expropriation complaint must allege public purpose only; owners will later be identified in separate proceedings to determine their interests.

• The expropriation complaint need not describe property; it only requests valuation, while ownership questions belong exclusively to proper administrative agencies.

Multiple Choice

Government corporation G files a verified expropriation complaint naming A and B as co-owner defendants. Summons is served only on A; B receives no process and never learns of the case. The court renders final judgment, fixes just compensation, and payment is made entirely to A. Two years later, B discovers the condemnation and asserts that he received no compensation for his share. Under Rule sixty seven doctrine, what is B’s proper remedy?

• B may still sue independently for damages, because an unserved joined owner may later recover compensation despite closure of condemnation.

• B has no remedy at law, because failure to join him extinguished ownership rights upon entry of the expropriation judgment.

• B must move to reopen the expropriation case, because independent damages suits are barred once title transfers under court judgment.

Expropriation is a forced taking of private property, so due process requirements are treated very strictly. The owner is an unwilling seller, “without a ghost of a chance” to defeat the taking once the power is validly exercised. Because of that, the State must at least show a genuine public need. The complaint itself must clearly state, or at least reasonably allow the court to deduce, an exacting public purpose. It is not enough to recite vague formulas; the purpose must be real and concrete.

If, after proceedings, it turns out that the taking is not for a public purpose, the general rule is that the expropriation must be dismissed. However, the Supreme Court has recognized narrow exceptions, such as when the trial court’s order has already become final and executory, when the government has already taken possession, or when the proceedings have already caused prejudice to the landowner.

Public use is not only a threshold requirement; it must be maintained throughout. If the government later abandons the public purpose—like changing the use from public to purely private—the consequences can include reversion or other remedies to protect the owner’s right.

On judicial review, once the State validly decides to exercise eminent domain and meets the basic public use threshold, the courts’ role is largely confined to determining just compensation. You cannot ordinarily stop the expropriation itself through prohibition. Prohibition becomes a viable remedy only when just compensation is not paid or agreed upon—when the financial side of the taking, not the policy decision to take, is what violates rights.

Multiple Choice

Which statement best reflects the mandatory due process requirement regarding public purpose in an expropriation complaint?

• Expropriation complaints must allege a genuine public purpose, at least reasonably deducible, to satisfy strict due process requirements.

• Expropriation complaints need not allege any public purpose, because courts presume governmental purposes are always sufficiently genuine anyway.

• Expropriation complaints may allege vague public convenience alone, without articulating any specific governmental project, purpose, or necessity whatsoever.

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly expresses the rule and narrow exceptions when expropriation lacks a valid public purpose?

• Generally, expropriation must be dismissed absent public purpose, unless final judgment, government possession, or prejudice already intervened earlier.

• Generally, expropriation must be dismissed absent public purpose, with no exceptions once lack of necessity becomes judicially determined.

• Generally, expropriation may proceed without public purpose, provided landowners receive generous compensation and voluntarily accept negotiated transfer terms.

Multiple Choice

The government files expropriation to build a public highway, takes possession, and the case proceeds to valuation. Landowners later disagree with the amount of just compensation but do not dispute the public purpose. They now consider filing prohibition to stop the expropriation entirely. Which statement best reflects the proper doctrinal approach?

• Prohibition is proper only if just compensation remains unpaid or disputed; otherwise courts mainly determine valuation, not necessity.

• Prohibition is proper whenever landowners oppose expropriation, since courts may freely review necessity and public purpose determinations entirely.

• Prohibition is proper once complaint is filed, preventing courts from fixing compensation until public purpose becomes incontrovertibly established.

Expropriation and escheat both end with the State getting property, but they are very different creatures.

Expropriation under Rule 67 is an exercise of eminent domain. The State (or a duly authorized instrumentality) takes identified private property for a concrete public use, and it must pay just compensation. It is a special civil action filed in the Regional Trial Court where the property is located, because the subject – the State’s power of eminent domain – is a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation. The complaint must be verified, must clearly allege the plaintiff’s right to expropriate and the public purpose, must describe the property, and must join all persons owning, claiming to own, or occupying any interest in the property. You only go to court when the owner refuses to sell, or is willing to sell but disagrees on price.

Escheat under Rule 91 is a special proceeding of a different kind. It is not about public use projects but about “ownerless” property reverting to the State. Classic escheat: a decedent dies with no heirs and no one entitled by law to succeed, so his estate escheats, or reverts, to the State. There is no concept of “just compensation” here, because the logic is succession, not involuntary sale. Venue also tracks the decedent, not the land: the Regional Trial Court where the deceased last resided, or where his estate may be found if he resided outside the Philippines.

So in short: expropriation is taking for public use with just compensation, filed where the property lies; escheat is reversion of property with no rightful private claimant, filed where the deceased last resided or his estate is found.

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly describes expropriation, as distinguished from escheat and partition under the procedural Rules of Court?

• Expropriation is a Rule sixty seven action taking property for public use with just compensation.

• Escheat is a Rule ninety one proceeding reverting property to the State without just compensation.

• Partition is a Rule sixty nine proceeding dividing property among coowners through ordinary civil action.

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly states venue and nature of an expropriation complaint under Rule sixty seven of the Rules of Court?

• Expropriation must be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the property lies, being incapable of pecuniary estimation.

• Expropriation must be filed in the Municipal Trial Court where the property lies, being incapable of pecuniary estimation.

• Expropriation must be filed in the Court of Appeals where the property lies, being incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Multiple Choice

The city government needs a parcel of land for a public park. The owner is willing to sell but rejects the city’s offered price as too low. Negotiations fail. The city now wants to proceed to court to exercise eminent domain. Which course of action is doctrinally correct?

• The city must file a verified complaint stating its right and public purpose, describing the land, and joining all owners because price disagreement prevents voluntary sale.

• The city must file a simple letter asking the court to fix price alone, since public purpose is presumed and joining all owners is unnecessary paperwork.

• The city must delay filing any court complaint until owners agree on valuation, because expropriation requires unanimous consent before courts examine public purpose or property description.

Expropriation is not only done directly by the National Government. The power of eminent domain is legislative in origin, but it may be delegated to local government units, to agencies, and to public utilities by statute. An LGU, for example, may expropriate only because Congress has delegated that power in Section 19 of the Local Government Code, and only within the limits and conditions laid down there. It is never an “inherent” LGU power; it is borrowed and fenced in by the enabling law.

Outside the classic Rule 67 case, you also see expropriation logic in agrarian reform. Under the agrarian reform program, the Land Bank’s initial valuation becomes the basis of the “offer” and of the provisional deposit. The taking is still for public use in the constitutional sense, but the procedure and valuation rules follow special agrarian statutes, not just Rule 67.

Another special context is the energy and power sector. A public utility or transmission corporation armed with eminent domain may occupy private land in the interest of public service even without prior negotiated sale or formal Rule 67 expropriation. If the owner sues for ejectment or recovery of possession, the courts will not simply throw the utility out. Public policy and necessity, and equitable estoppel, block ejectment. Instead, the court will dismiss the ejectment without prejudice to an action for just compensation, or direct the utility to file proper expropriation proceedings, or even treat the ejectment case as an expropriation case and fix just compensation if it has jurisdiction over the value of the land.

For national infrastructure projects, Rule 67 works together with Republic Act No. 8974. Expropriation here still follows the two-phase structure. First, the court determines the propriety of the taking, meaning authority, public purpose, and compliance with statutory requirements. Only after that does it move to the second phase, which is the determination of just compensation. So you always ask in order: may the government take, and if yes, for how much?

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly describes the source and limits of an LGU’s power to expropriate private property within its territorial jurisdiction?

• An LGU may expropriate only when Congress delegates the power by law and subject to the statutory conditions and limitations.

• An LGU inherently possesses eminent domain and may expropriate property without any congressional delegation, statutory conditions, or limitations whatsoever imposed.

• An LGU may expropriate even absent enabling law so long as the mayor personally certifies the project as necessary today.

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly expresses the doctrine on landowners and public utilities endowed with eminent domain that occupy property without prior expropriation?

• A landowner generally cannot eject a public utility with eminent domain; the recourse is recovery of just compensation instead only.

• A landowner may always obtain ejectment against utilities occupying property without prior expropriation, because public policy never restricts such remedy.

• Courts must dismiss ejectment suits against utilities and cannot award compensation or convert the case into expropriation proceedings for landowners.

Multiple Choice

The national government files expropriation to build an expressway under Republic Act No. eight nine seven four. The complaint alleges authority, public purpose, and describes the land. Owners contest the taking and the amount. Under Rule sixty seven and RA eight nine seven four, how should the trial court structure its task?

• The trial court first rules on propriety of expropriation, then later determines just compensation, consistent with Rule sixty seven procedure.

• The trial court immediately fixes compensation only, because propriety of expropriation is exclusively decided by Congress before filing any complaint.

• The trial court must resolve compensation first, then decide propriety later, since valuation issues always precede questions regarding public purpose.

In every expropriation case, the law imagines two big doors, and the taking is not complete until you’ve passed through both.

The first stage begins with the filing of the complaint in the Regional Trial Court. Here the court is not yet concerned with the peso value of the land. Its task is to decide whether the plaintiff may exercise the power of eminent domain at all in the context of the case. It asks: does this plaintiff have authority to expropriate, and is the taking for a valid public purpose? If the court finds no authority or no public use, it must dismiss the case. If it finds that the taking is proper, it issues an order of condemnation declaring that the property may be taken for that public purpose. That order ends the first stage.

The second stage is about money: the determination of just compensation. After condemnation, the court proceeds to fix the fair value of the property. Rule 67 directs the court to appoint not more than three commissioners, who will receive evidence, inspect the property, and recommend a valuation. The court then reviews the commissioners’ report, sets the amount of just compensation, orders the plaintiff to pay that amount to the landowner, and completely disposes of the case. Expropriation is not truly complete until both stages are finished and just compensation has actually been paid.

There is also a provisional mechanism that allows the plaintiff to enter the property even before final judgment. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may take or enter possession of the real property if certain requisites are met. There must be due notice to the defendant. The plaintiff must deposit with an authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for taxation purposes, in money or, if authorized by the court, via a certificate of deposit of a government bank payable on demand. This amount is held subject to court orders. If personal property is involved, the court provisionally fixes its value and the corresponding deposit. These safeguards balance the State’s need to proceed with projects and the owner’s right to provisional security while just compensation is still being judicially determined.

Multiple Choice

Which statement best captures the doctrinal two-stage structure of expropriation proceedings under Rule sixty seven?

• The first stage tests authority and public purpose; the second stage fixes just compensation through commissioners and court judgment.

• The first stage fixes compensation and appoints commissioners; the second stage tests authority and public purpose through court judgment.

• The first stage ends with an order of condemnation; the second stage fixes just compensation through final judicial determination.

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly describes the plaintiff’s right to enter upon the property during expropriation under Rule sixty seven, section two?

• Plaintiff may enter upon possession after due notice and deposit of assessed value in an authorized government depository as Rule sixty seven requires.

• Plaintiff may enter upon possession after merely filing complaint, without any notice, deposit, assessment, valuation, prior security, formal judicial court authorization first whatsoever.

• Plaintiff may enter upon possession only after final judgment fixing compensation and complete payment of the full adjudged amount deposited entirely into court.

Multiple Choice

After an order of condemnation, the government deposits the assessed value, enters the land, and commissioners later recommend a higher valuation. The court fixes just compensation in a judgment, but the government delays paying the full amount for several years. The landowner asks if expropriation is already complete and what rights remain. Which statement is doctrinally correct?

• Expropriation remains incomplete until government fully pays the just compensation adjudged; landowner may demand payment, interest, and continued judicial supervision.

• Expropriation became complete upon the condemnation order alone; landowner may no longer demand payment through court because title already transferred.

• Expropriation became complete upon initial assessed value deposit; landowner’s sole remedy is accepting amount without questioning sufficiency, delay, or interest.

In expropriation, “immediate entry” is always tied to how much the government has already put on the table.

Under the general Rule 67 scheme, any plaintiff-expropriator (whether national government, GOCC, or LGU) can ask to enter and take possession of the real property after filing the complaint if it gives due notice to the landowner and deposits with an authorized government depository bank an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for taxation purposes. That deposit is in money, unless the court authorizes the use of a certificate of deposit from a government bank payable on demand. This is only provisional security; the full just compensation can later be higher.

For national government infrastructure projects, Republic Act No. 8974 and the Right-of-Way Act (RA 10752) change the rules in favor of the landowner. Here, Rule 67’s “assessed value deposit” is superseded by an “immediate payment” scheme. Before the court can issue a writ of possession, the national government must immediately pay the landowner 100% of the Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal value of the property, plus the value of any improvements and structures. The zonal value is determined by the BIR, not by the court. Only after this immediate payment can the national government enter.

So: ordinary expropriation, deposit of assessed value under Rule 67; national government infrastructure, immediate payment of 100% zonal value plus improvements under RA 8974 and RA 10752.

Multiple Choice

Which statement best describes the general Rule sixty seven scheme for a plaintiff’s provisional entry into possession of real property?

• Under Rule sixty seven, plaintiff may enter possession upon depositing the assessed tax value in an authorized government depository bank therein.

• Under Rule sixty seven, plaintiff may enter possession upon paying market value in cash directly to defendants without any court participation.

• Under Rule sixty seven, plaintiff may enter possession upon promising future payment without any assessed value deposit or judicial authorization whatsoever.

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly reflects the special rule under Republic Act eight nine seven four for national government infrastructure expropriation?

• For national infrastructure projects, the government must immediately pay one hundred percent zonal value plus improvements before issuance of writ.

• For national infrastructure projects, the government must merely deposit assessed tax value without paying for improvements before issuance of writ.

• For national infrastructure projects, the government may enter immediately without any deposit, payment, valuation, improvements, or court issued writ whatsoever.

Multiple Choice

The DPWH files expropriation to acquire a right-of-way for a national highway. It asks the RTC for a writ of possession to enter the land at once. The project clearly falls under Republic Act eight nine seven four and the Right of Way Act. What must DPWH do regarding payment before the court can issue the writ of possession?

• The agency must tender one hundred percent zonal value plus improvements in money before the trial court issues a writ of possession.

• The agency must merely deposit assessed tax value in bank before the trial court considers any application for writ of possession therein.

• The agency must postpone any entry until final judgment and then pay compensation only after appellate review of writ of possession thereafter.

In expropriation, once the complaint is filed and answered, the issues are kept very tight. Rule 67 expressly forbids counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party complaints in the answer or any later pleading. The only allowable “fight” is over the right to expropriate and, later, the amount of just compensation. Any other claims must be raised in separate actions.

The court may issue an Order of Expropriation in two situations: when the objections and defenses against the plaintiff’s right to expropriate are overruled, or when no party appears to oppose. That order declares that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property for the public use or purpose stated in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of taking or of filing, whichever came first. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate is appealable, and appeal is the proper remedy (not certiorari), but that appeal does not prevent the court from proceeding to determine just compensation.

On the issue of just compensation, any defendant, whether or not he previously answered or appeared, may still present evidence on the amount to be paid and share in the distribution of the award. After the order of expropriation, the court must appoint up to three competent and disinterested commissioners. They take an oath, receive evidence, may inspect and measure the property, and must assess consequential damages and benefits, then make a full report. The court is not bound blindly by that report: after objections and hearing, it may accept it, recommit it, set it aside and appoint new commissioners, or accept in part and reject in part. Throughout, the court must secure to the plaintiff the property needed for expropriation and to the defendant just compensation, even when ownership is uncertain, in which case the award may be paid into court.

Multiple Choice

Which statement best reflects the remedy from a final order sustaining the right to expropriate, and its effect on valuation?

• A final order sustaining the right to expropriate is appealable, and appeal does not halt just compensation proceedings.

• A final order sustaining the right to expropriate is reviewable only by certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion.

• A final order sustaining the right to expropriate is interlocutory, never appealable until after compensation judgment becomes final.

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly describes the role and effect of commissioners in fixing just compensation under Rule sixty seven?

• The court must appoint disinterested commissioners to receive evidence, inspect the property, and recommend just compensation values thereon.

• The court may dispense with commissioners and unilaterally fix compensation without evidence, inspection, hearings, or property viewings entirely.

• The court appoints commissioners, but their report is automatically final, requiring no objections, hearings, or judicial review whatsoever.

Multiple Choice

After an order of expropriation, landowner L disagrees with the government’s authority and valuation. L’s proper remedies are an appeal from the order and evidence before commissioners on just compensation.

Which alternative description of L’s remedies is doctrinally correct?

• After an order of expropriation, landowner L disagrees with the government’s authority and valuation. L’s proper remedies are an appeal from the order and evidence before commissioners on just compensation.

• After an order of expropriation, landowner L’s only remedy is certiorari, plus asserting counterclaims and crossclaims in the answer to recover damages within the same expropriation trial proceedings.

• After an order of expropriation, landowner L who appeals thereby waives participation in compensation hearings and loses any right to present valuation evidence before commissioners at any later trial stage.

Just compensation is the heart of any expropriation case. The Constitution does not just require “compensation”; it requires that it be “just.” In doctrine, this means the full and fair equivalent of the property taken, measured not by what the government gains but by what the owner loses. The amount must be real, substantial, full, and ample, not nominal or symbolic. Courts often express this using the formula: fair market value of the property, plus consequential damages to the remaining property not taken, minus consequential benefits derived by the owner from the public use. Consequential benefits can never exceed consequential damages, otherwise the owner would be short-changed.

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. Agencies like the BIR, Land Bank, or implementing offices may make initial valuations, but no statute or executive issuance can tie the court’s hands. Once the owner claims that the constitutional guarantee has been violated, the courts must be free to decide what is truly “just,” even if that means rejecting or adjusting the government’s own figures.

Timing also matters. As a rule, just compensation is determined as of the time of taking, meaning when the owner is effectively deprived of the use and benefit of the property, or as of the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first under Rule 67. However, if the State delays payment significantly, recent cases recognize that justice may require valuation based on the market value at the time of actual payment, to avoid rewarding delay at the owner’s expense.

Non-payment does not automatically allow the owner to eject the State. Possession already taken for a valid public purpose is not casually undone. But if the government fails to pay within five years from finality of the judgment fixing compensation, the owner may seek to recover possession of the property. On top of that, legal interest accrues to compensate for the delay.

For national government infrastructure projects, Republic Act No. 8974 and the Right of Way Act establish a system of immediate initial payment. Before the government can get a writ of possession, it must immediately pay 100% of the BIR zonal value plus the value of improvements, crops, and trees as assessed under the statute. This is still subject to final judicial determination of just compensation, but it front-loads protection for the owner and prevents government from entering for free.

Multiple Choice

Which statement best captures the doctrinal meaning of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases?

• Just compensation is measured by the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain, and must be full, real, and substantial.

• Just compensation is measured by the taker’s gain, not the owner’s loss, and may be partial, nominal, or symbolic.

• Just compensation is measured by assessed tax value alone, without regard to owner’s loss or property’s real market price.

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly reflects the judicial role and reckoning time in fixing just compensation, including adjustments for delay?

• Courts finally determine just compensation strictly as of the time of taking, subject to adjustments when payment is unreasonably delayed.

• Executive agencies finally determine just compensation as of the time of payment, and courts are barred from reviewing that valuation.

• Congress finally determines just compensation as of assessed value alone, and courts may not adjust for delayed or partial payment.

Multiple Choice

The government expropriates land for a national highway, pays initial zonal value under Republic Act eight nine seven four, enters the property, and a judgment later fixes a higher just compensation. The government then fails to pay the balance for more than five years from finality. The owners ask what remedies remain. Which statement is most doctrinally accurate?

• The owners may seek interest and full judicial valuation; they may also recover possession if payment is withheld five years after finality.

• The owners lose all remedies once deposit is made; they may not demand interest, valuation, or recover possession after such delayed payment.

• The owners’ only remedy is administrative protest; courts cannot grant interest, valuation, or recovery of possession despite delayed or partial payment ever.

Once just compensation is fixed and actually paid (or validly tendered and deposited), the balance of power in expropriation shifts decisively to the plaintiff.

After judgment on just compensation, the plaintiff must pay the amount fixed by the court, together with legal interest from the time it first took possession. Once that payment is made, or valid tender is made and refused so that the amount is deposited in court, the plaintiff acquires the solid right either to enter upon the property and appropriate it for the public use stated in the judgment, or to retain possession if it already entered earlier under the provisional possession rules. If the owner or counsel disappears or refuses to receive the money, a court-ordered deposit has the same legal effect as actual payment. At that point, from the law’s perspective, the owner has been paid.

Appeals from the judgment do not paralyze the taking. An appeal from the order of expropriation or from the judgment on just compensation does not delay the plaintiff’s right to enter and use the property for the public purpose. The project can proceed while the case goes up. However, if the appellate court later rules that the plaintiff had no right to expropriate at all, the consequence is serious: the case is sent back to the trial court to restore possession to the owner and to determine the damages caused by the government’s wrongful occupation.

The judgment in expropriation must precisely describe what is being taken and why. It must clearly identify the particular property or interest expropriated and state the nature of the public use or purpose. A certified copy is then recorded with the Registry of Deeds, and this recording is what vests the title in the plaintiff for that public use. Where a guardian represents a minor or an incompetent owner, he or she may, with court approval, perform all acts in the expropriation that the ward could have done if competent.

Abandonment is all about what kind of title the decree gave. If the judgment or agreement clearly conditions the taking—for example, “for use as a public street only, and upon abandonment the property reverts to the former owner”—then when that specific public purpose is ended or abandoned, the former owner reacquires the property, unless a statute says otherwise. But if the decree (or sale) conveyed fee simple title unconditionally, the expropriator becomes absolute owner. In that case, even if the original public use is discontinued and the land is put to a different use, there is no automatic reversion; the former owner’s title is gone.

Multiple Choice

Which statement best reflects the plaintiff’s rights after payment or valid tender of the just compensation fixed by judgment?

• Plaintiff may enter or retain possession after full payment with legal interest or valid tender and deposit in court.

• Plaintiff may enter or retain possession immediately upon filing the complaint, without any payment, tender, judgment, or court deposit.

• Plaintiff may enter or retain possession only after appeal ends and title records, despite any prior payment or deposit.

Multiple Choice

Which statement correctly states the effect of an appeal on the plaintiff’s possession and the consequences of a reversal on the right to expropriate?

• Appeal does not delay plaintiff’s right to possess, but reversal restores property and allows landowner recovery of resulting damages.

• Appeal automatically suspends plaintiff’s right to possess, delaying entry and leaving landowner in undisturbed control without any compensation whatsoever.

• Appeal bars plaintiff from entering property at all, even after deposit, until appellate courts finally affirm expropriation and valuation.

Multiple Choice

The city expropriates a lot “in fee simple for general public purposes” with no reversion clause. After years, it stops using the land as a park and leases it to a private mall developer. The former owner’s heirs sue, arguing that abandonment of the original public use requires reversion. Which is the most accurate doctrinal statement?

• No reversion occurs because fee simple title was acquired unconditionally; abandonment or change of use does not defeat that title.

• Reversion automatically occurs because public use was abandoned; fee simple title ends once property is leased commercially for private profit.

• Reversion requires a specific statutory clause or condition; absent such limitation, heirs may only claim additional compensation or further damages.