WorksheetsFinal Pro Res Questions Courtney
Total questions: 85
Worksheet time: 43mins
Prosecutors from the Department of Justice (DOJ) began an antitrust investigation into Conglomerate Corporation, and the DOJ began questioning some of Conglomerate's business customers. Conglomerate’s attorney prepared a memorandum analyzing the antitrust implications of Conglomerate's standard contract form with commercial purchasers. Soon thereafter, some Conglomerate employees received subpoenas to testify before a grand jury that was investigating the same antitrust issues in their industry. The attorney worried that the grand jury would indict Conglomerate, so she interviewed the employees herself and prepared a debriefing memorandum. Would the attorney’s two memoranda described above come under the protection of the work product doctrine?
The memorandum analyzing the contract is work product, but not the memorandum summarizing the employee statements.
The memorandum summarizing the employee statements is work product, but not the memorandum analyzing the contract.
Both the lawyer's memorandum analyzing the contract form and the lawyer's debriefing memorandum were prepared in anticipation of litigation, because a grand jury proceeding is itself litigation.
Neither the lawyer's memorandum analyzing the contract form and the lawyer's debriefing memorandum were prepared in anticipation of litigation.
The law school casebook industry was heavily consolidated. Several witnesses testified before a grand jury investigating this specialized publishing industry. Shortly afterward, an attorney for East Publishing Company debriefed the witnesses and wrote memoranda of those interviews in anticipation of the potential indictment of East Publishing, and the anticipated civil suits that could follow. Five years later, some plaintiffs representing a class of law school casebook consumers filed an antitrust class action against East Publishing and sought discovery of the non-opinion work-product portions of the attorney’s debriefing memoranda. The plaintiffs were careful in preparing their case and gathering evidence through other means, and they can show that the witnesses in question were no longer able to remember some of the events to which they testified at the previous grand jury proceeding. Should a court order the attorney to produce the memorandum?
Yes, this situation falls under the need-and-hardship exception to the work product doctrine.
Yes, because the witness statements are only facts, not the attorney’s own thoughts.
No, because the memorandum is attorney work product.
No, because the witnesses are still available to testify, even if their memories are fading as time passes, as is true with all witnesses in litigation.
A defendant accused of bank robbery hired an attorney. The attorney interviewed a bank teller, who witnessed the robbery. The attorney memorialized the conversation in a written memorandum that qualified as work product. Later, during the trial, the same teller testified for the prosecution, and the attorney cross-examined the bank teller by quoting from the teller's prior statement, as memorialized in the memorandum. The bank teller then denied making the statements. In turn, the prosecutor demanded a copy of the document from which the attorney had read statements during the cross-examination, and the attorney objected that the document was attorney work product and therefore not subject to discovery. Is the attorney correct?
Yes, if the attorney prepared the document in anticipation of litigation, the memorandum is work product and is not subject to discovery or compelled disclosure.
Yes, disclosure would violate the criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses, guaranteed in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the right against self-incrimination, guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment.
No, when the attorney chose to ask the teller questions with direct reference to the memorandum, it waived work-product immunity for the portion of the memorandum discussing the teller's story, and any other parts of the document that are necessary to place all the testimony fairly into context.
No, the entire document merely summarizes the factual statements of an eyewitness, and it contains no attorney work product.
The DOJ brought an antitrust suit against Conglomerate Corporation. Giant Company separately sued Conglomerate, mostly alleging the same facts that the DOJ had alleged in its case, and Giant sought parallel relief. An attorney for Giant Company showed the DOJ lawyers some documents that constituted part of the attorney’s work product in Gian Company’s parallel lawsuit against Conglomerate. Giant Company and the DOJ formally agreed that the DOJ would use documents only in litigation against Conglomerate Corporation. Later, however, in the government's case, Conglomerate Corporation sought discovery of Giant Company’s work product, that is, the documents that Giant’s attorney had shared with the DOJ. How should the court rule on this discovery request?
Only Giant Company but not the DOJ (government) may properly assert Giant’s work-product protection for the documents.
Only the DOJ but not Giant Company may properly assert Giant’s work-product protection for the documents.
Neither Both Giant Company and the DOJ (government) may properly assert Giant’s work-product protection for the documents.
Both Giant Company and the DOJ (government) may properly assert Giant’s work-product protection for the documents, under the common-interest doctrine.
An attorney had many years of experience in handling personal injury litigation, and in a certain case, the attorney represented a plaintiff in litigation over injuries sustained in a car accident. In preparation for trial, the attorney interviewed each of the eyewitnesses of the accident, and afterward wrote a memorandum summarizing what each witness said. The witnesses themselves agreed to swear and sign the statements, as if they were affidavits. The statements contained no mental impressions of the attorney, only facts communicated by the witnesses. Opposing counsel eventually learned of these interviews and sought discovery of the witness statements that the plaintiff’s attorney had drafted. Unsurprisingly, the attorney objected that these documents were attorney work-product doctrine. Should the court compel the production of the witness statements?
Yes, the witnesses themselves have a right to assert protection from disclosure of their statements, but not the attorney.
Yes, witness statements contain only factual information, and underlying facts do not come under the protection of the work-product doctrine.
No, lawyers may not discover any materials prepared by the other lawyer in anticipation of litigation.
No, because the attorney prepared the witness statements on behalf of the plaintiff in anticipation of the litigation.
An attorney agreed to represent a plaintiff who sustained serious injuries three months earlier when she fell through a defective staircase on the defendant’s premises. Her hospitalization after the incident prevented the plaintiff from securing legal representation for twelve weeks. The attorney filed a personal injury lawsuit immediately, and the defendant retained counsel for the litigation in response. The defendant’s lawyer visited the accident scene immediately and took photographs. By that time, the defendant had completely rebuilt the staircase, adding additional handrails, bannisters, and other safeguards. Later, as the litigation proceeded through the discovery phase, the plaintiff’s attorney sought production of defense counsel’s photographs of the scene, and defense counsel objected that the photographs were non-discoverable attorney work product. The attorney for the plaintiff explained in a motion to the court that the lapse of time since the accident prevented the attorney from viewing the accident scene as it was at the time, invoking the need-and-hardship doctrine. Moreover, the plaintiff’s delay in securing counsel was due to her injuries and hospitalization, which were not her fault. How should the court rule?
The court should deny the motion because the photos depict a completely different staircase than the one that caused the accident, so they are no more helpful than photos the plaintiff could take now.
The court should compel production of the photographs because there is no other way for the plaintiff to establish the condition of the staircase at the time of the accident.
The court should compel production of the photographs because the images themselves do not constitute attorney work product, as they contain no opinions, ideas, or impressions of the lawyer.
The court should deny the motion because discovery would discourage lawyers from taking their own photographs of accident scenes.
An attorney represented a client in litigation. During the discovery phase of the matter, the opposing party sought to discover communications from a meeting that the attorney had previously organized to prepare for the case. The attorney, an accountant, certain interested creditors, and the bankruptcy liquidation committee members had all attended the meeting, as well as a few others. The attorney resisted discovery based on the work product doctrine. The opposing party countered that the presence of other parties besides the attorney, the client, and their necessary agents waived the privilege. How should the court rule?
The court should compel discovery because the presence of third parties negated to confidentiality requirement for privilege.
The court should deny the request and not force the attorney to violate the ethical duty of confidentiality.
The court should first determine whether the discussions pertained primarily to the legal interests of the party seeking discovery.
The court should deny discovery because the work product doctrine protects the information from disclosure.
An attorney agreed to represent a plaintiff who sustained serious injuries three months earlier when she fell through a defective staircase on the defendant’s premises. Her hospitalization after the incident prevented the plaintiff from securing legal representation for twelve weeks. The attorney filed a personal injury lawsuit immediately, and the defendant retained counsel for the litigation in response. The defendant’s lawyer, however, had visited the accident scene immediately after the accident and took photographs. Two weeks later, the defendant completely rebuilt the staircase, adding additional handrails, bannisters, and other safeguards. Later, as the litigation proceeded through the discovery phase, the plaintiff’s attorney sought production of defense counsel’s photographs of the scene, and defense counsel objected that the photographs were non-discoverable attorney work product. The attorney for the plaintiff explained in a motion to the court that the lapse of time since the accident prevented the attorney from viewing the accident scene as it was at the time, invoking the need-and-hardship doctrine. Moreover, the plaintiff’s delay in securing counsel was due to her injuries and hospitalization, which were not her fault. How should the court rule?
The court should compel production of the photographs because there is no other way for the plaintiff to establish the condition of the staircase at the time of the accident.
The court should compel production of the photographs because the images themselves do not constitute attorney work product, as they contain no opinions, ideas, or impressions of the lawyer.
The court should deny the motion because the photos depict a completely different staircase than the one that caused the accident, so they are no more helpful than photos the plaintiff could take now.
The court should deny the motion because discovery would discourage lawyers from taking their own photographs of accident scenes.
An attorney had a series of private meetings with a client about incorporating the client’s new business venture as an LLC. The attorney kept careful notes of these discussions. Which of the following is true regarding these notes about the conversations between the attorney and the client?
The attorney’s notes would come under the protection of the attorney’s duty of confidentiality but not the work product doctrine.
The attorney’s notes would come under the protection of attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.
The attorney’s notes would come under the protection of the attorney’s duty of confidentiality but not attorney-client privilege.
The attorney’s notes would not come under the protection of the work product doctrine, nor attorney-client privilege.
An attorney had a series of private meetings with a client about the subject matter of the representation. The attorney kept careful notes of these discussions, along with the attorney’s reflections and concerns. Sometime later, an opposing party in litigation moved to compel production of these notes. Which of the following is most likely to be a reason that the attorney would assert attorney-client privilege for these notes, rather than claim they are attorney work product?
The client’s friend had been present during the conversations.
The representation pertained to anticipated litigation that seemed immediate at the time.
The client had recounted the conversations to a friend immediately afterward
The need and hardship exception
An attorney had a series of private meetings with a client about the subject matter of the representation. The attorney kept careful notes of these discussions. Sometime later, an opposing party in litigation moved to compel production of these notes. Which of the following is most likely to be a reason that the attorney would try claiming that they are attorney work product, rather than asserting attorney-client privilege for these notes?
The representation pertained to anticipated litigation that seemed immediate at the time.
The notes are written documents rather than the attorney’s mental recollections of the meetings.
The need and hardship exception.
The client’s friend had been present during the conversations.
An attorney had a series of private meetings with a client about the subject matter of the representation. The attorney kept careful notes of these discussions, along with some of the attorney’s reflections and ideas. Sometime later, an opposing party in litigation moved to compel production of these notes. Which of the following is most likely to be a reason that the attorney would assert attorney-client privilege for these notes, rather than claim they are attorney work product?
The client’s friend had been present during the conversations.
The client had recounted the conversations to a group of friends immediately afterward.
The attorney’s firm had an unexpected data breach, despite the firm’s updated firewalls and password protection, and the breach allowed an unknown hacker to access the notes before the litigation began.
The representation pertained to an employee manual that the attorney was drafting for the client’s business.
For purposes of attorney work product protection, which of the following is NOT likely to create an objectively and subjectively reasonable “anticipation” of litigation:
An outside event certain to generate litigation
An adversarial party’s explicit threat
In some circumstances, a corporate client’s own internal actions gearing up to sue an industry rival
A client who has a history of being extraordinarily litigious
An attorney served as the director of the Environmental Enforcement Division of the state Attorney General’s office, which brought legal actions against polluters in the state. The Attorney General’s Office hired only lawyers with three years’ experience or more – they never hired new law school graduates. In the Environmental Enforcement Division, all the lawyers had many years of experience as litigators in that field. The attorney who served as director oversaw the prioritization of cases and implementation of the Attorney General’s policy objectives, and assigned cases to the lawyers in her Division, but did not need to monitor their work, train them in legal ethics, or watch for ethical violations, because all the lawyers were competent and experienced. It turned out, however, that one of the lawyers committed some ethical violations, such as testifying as the key witness in a trial in which he was the attorney of record for the state, which was the plaintiff or prosecuting party in the cases. In another instance, the lawyer brought an enforcement action that had no factual basis in retaliation against an entity that had defrauded the lawyer of a substantial amount of money. When these violations received attention in a local new station expose, the lawyer resigned in disgrace, and the Attorney General took the position that the director of the Environmental Enforcement Division is not responsible for the actions of this individual lawyer, whom he described as a “bad apple” in the Division. Is he correct?
Yes, even though the Model Rules state that lawyers in supervisory positions can be subject to discipline for the ethical violations of their subordinates, these rules contain an explicit exemption for government agencies.
Yes, because all the lawyers in the Division were competent and experienced, and it was reasonable for the Division director not to monitor their activities or provide ethical training like she would for newly licensed lawyers.
No, lawyers having comparable managerial authority in a government agency must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the agency or department conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct
No, even though the Model Rules merely require that lawyers in regular supervisory positions take reasonable steps to ensure that their subordinates follow the rules, there is a higher standard for supervisory lawyers in government agencies, who have strict liability for abuses of government power by their subordinates
A certain attorney worked at Big Firm, and she was supervising a new associate lawyer there. During a negotiation for the sale of a company, in which Big Firm represented the seller, the associate informed the buyer’s lawyers that certain assets of the company had no liens or other encumbrances on them, and that she had verified this herself. This was a misrepresentation – the properties had significant encumbrances, which the purchase price should have reflected, but it did not. The supervising attorney, who was part of the conversation when the associate made the misrepresentation, did not correct her, because she did not want to humiliate her in front of the opposing party, or reveal an internal discord among Big Firm’s lawyers. Instead, the supervising attorney lectured the associate about the misrepresentation privately the next day, and he told her not to let it happen again. Then they agreed to drop the matter, and the supervising attorney instructed the associate to watch for a good opportunity to bring up the mistake and clarify the matter for the buyer. The associate never did so. Could the supervising attorney be subject to discipline for failing to correct the resulting misapprehension by the buyer?
Yes, the supervising attorney had a duty during the conversation in which the misrepresentation occurred to correct the associate in front of the opposing party.
Yes, the supervising attorney had a duty to take affirmative steps to correct the misapprehension of the other party, sometime before the consummation of the purchase.
No, it was the associate’s duty to correct her own misrepresentation, and the supervising attorney instructed her to do so.
No, it was not an ethical violation for the associate to misstate that she had checked for liens and encumbrances herself, as opposing counsel would normally do their own check for this.
An associate worked at Big Firm. Even though she had only recently graduated from law school, the associate had earned the respect of the partners at the firm, and she was involved in several projects for multiple lawyers and clients. Overwhelmed with looming deadlines on multiple matters, she realized that she could not devote enough attention to each client's issues - she could not provide competent, diligent representation to so many clients at once. She approached the partner who was her mentor at the firm and explained her concerns, and he responded that she was just experiencing a learning curve, and that her workload was in fact normal, and that she should stop complaining. A few weeks later, the associate was conducting research on a client matter, and she overlooked an important case related to her issue, despite her conscientious work ethic. At the time, she was racing against deadlines on two other projects, was working long hours, and was sleeping only five hours a night on average. Big Firm has a managing partner and a committee of senior partners. Could the partner who was her mentor be subject to disciplinary action for the associate's mistake?
Yes, the partners at a firm have strict liability for ethical violations of their associates or subordinates.
Yes, partners and others in a supervisory role at a firm are responsible to monitor the workload of their subordinate attorneys.
No, overlooking a case while conducting research does not constitute an ethical violation.
No, only the managing partner at the firm has responsibility for monitoring the workload of the associates.
An attorney had supervisory responsibilities for a new lawyer at her firm, but she had her own cases and clients to handle. It was a busy season for the firm, so the attorney did not check on the associate herself, but she would take time to answer questions if the associate approached her. The associate needed more oversight and direction that she received, and she committed several serious ethical violations. The supervising attorney had no way of knowing about these because the associate was always careful to cover up her mistakes or blame others when something went wrong. Could the supervising attorney avoid responsibility for the associate’s ethical violations even if she did not direct, ratify, or have knowledge of the associate’s misdeeds?
Yes, because the Model Rules require actual knowledge of a subordinate’s ethical violations to trigger disciplinary liability for the supervising attorneys.
Yes, the Model Rules require actual knowledge of the violations to trigger a duty to report the violations of another lawyer in one’s firm.
No, an attorney having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the ethical rules, even apart from the supervising attorney directing, ratifying, or even knowing about a specific violation.
No, supervisory attorneys are automatically responsible for ethical violations by their subordinates if the subordinate engages in a repeated pattern of hiding, covering up, or blaming others for her actions.
An attorney was the District Attorney for a local prosecutor’s office, and she had several subordinate lawyers working under her authority and oversight. This office had a series of appeals from defendants they prosecuted, and in several cases, the appellate courts reversed the convictions over Brady violations, that is, withholding exculpatory material evidence from defense counsel. Is the District Attorney immune to discipline for these violations?
Yes, the Model Rules impose an ethical duty of disclosure on prosecutors only for exculpatory evidence that is “clear and convincing,” so a Brady reversal does not necessarily indicate an ethical violation by the prosecutor in the case.
Yes, the remedy for Brady violations is for the court to impose direct sanctions on the government lawyers in the case, and this judicial remedy preempts disciplinary action by the state bar in an administrative proceeding
No, because a series of reversed convictions over Brady violations from the same office indicates a lack of training or supervision regarding the ethical duties of prosecutors.
No, if there were more than three clear instances of prosecutors withholding exculpatory evidence within her office during a five-year period.
An attorney worked as an entry-level prosecutor. She did not have a supervisory position or title in her office hierarchy, but merely worked on her assigned cases under the direction and oversight of the higher-ranked lawyers in the office. On one occasion, however, a case arose involving an issue that was important to her, so she asked to be the lead prosecutor on this one case. The District Attorney agreed, and assigned one other lawyer in the office, who was also an entry-level prosecutor, to assist her on the matter. The case had two defendants, and at one point, the attorney leading the prosecution was in one room negotiating a plea arrangement with the first defendant, and the lawyer assisting her was negotiating with the other defendant at the same time in the next room. The state’s main witness against the two defendants was a third co-conspirator who had become an informant in exchange for a favorable plea that involved no jail time. The lawyer assisting in the case lied to the second defendant and denied that the state’s witness had agreed to a deal. The lawyer had told the lead attorney on the case that he planned to do this beforehand, and she informed him that this would be unethical, but she did not try to stop him from doing so, because she was not his boss. After the negotiations, they met to debrief, and he informed her that he had indeed lied to the defendant and defense counsel about the state’s arrangement with their main witness in the case. She reminded him that this violated the ethical rules, but she took no further action, because she was only an entry-level prosecutor, at the same rank as the lawyer assisting on the case. Could the attorney, as lead prosecutor on the case, be subject for the ethical violations in this case?
Yes, all the lawyers working together on a case are responsible for the actions of the others regarding their conduct related to that matter.
Yes, even if a lawyer is not a partner or other general manager, she directly supervises the work of the other lawyer as lead prosecutor in this proceeding.
No, ordinarily a lawyer will not be subject to discipline for the actions of other lawyers who are at the same level in the office.
No, because she did not have a supervisory position or title in her office hierarchy.
An insurance company routinely hired outside counsel to represent its policyholders in litigation under liability policy. An inexperienced attorney worked for the firm. The firm’s partners charged the policyholders fees for the representation even though the insurer was already paying their legal fees; this and other aspects of their fee arrangements violated state insurance laws, as well as the ethical rules about reasonable fees. The inexperienced acted as the partners directed him to do and charged clients these fees that were illegal and unreasonable, but at one point he raised concerns about the practice with one of the partners. The partner said he would check into it. Would the safe harbor provision of Model Rule 5.2(b) absolve the attorney of a duty to research the fee issue?
Yes, a subordinate lawyer does not violate the ethical rules when acting upon a partner’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.
Yes, because the attorney raised his concerns with the partner, who agreed to investigate the issue, so the attorney should wait until the partner has time to research it.
No, the attorney had a duty to research the issue himself and would have discovered that the fees were clearly illegal and unreasonable.
No, the safe harbor provision does not apply when a firm is serving as outside counsel for an insurance company or a bank
An attorney had recently graduated from law school and entered the practice of law. After a federal clerkship, he went to work for Big Firm, which paid the highest associates’ salaries in the state. A partner at Big Firm gave the attorney an assignment to represent the teenage daughter of one Big Firm’s most important clients, a billionaire social media entrepreneur. The daughter had been part of a group of student protesters that the police had arrested the previous week for trespassing. When arrested, the daughter had given the police a friend’s driver’s license and identified herself as the friend, who had a similar appearance. The police mistakenly charged the daughter under the friend’s name, and the district attorney proceeded to prosecute her under the mistaken identity. The friend, whose name and driver’s license the daughter had used, was unaware that she was the named defendant in a misdemeanor criminal case, and the billionaire’s daughter, who was now the attorney’s client, continued with the ruse even as she remained in custody along with the other protestors. During a private consultation with her, the attorney asked about the name discrepancy, as he was expecting to represent the daughter of Big Firm’s client, and the girl explained the false identification, and insisted that the attorney not disclose her real identity to the police or the court. Back at the firm’s office, the attorney approached the partner who had assigned the case, but before the attorney could finish explaining the name problem, the partner said, “Do not mess this up, her father is an important client of the firm. Convince the court to drop the charges as quickly as possible. Close this matter quickly.” The attorney spoke to the prosecutor and convinced her to dismiss the case, but the attorney never told her about the misidentification of his client. After the dismissal of the case, the attorney met with the billionaire’s daughter and her mother, together with the friend whose name she had used and the friend’s parents, who were upset that their daughter had been a named defendant in the matter in the first place. Despite the attorney’s efforts to reassure the friend’s parents that the state dropped the charges, the friend’s parents contacted the prosecutor’s office in hopes of removing the arrest from their daughter’s record. When the prosecutor realized what had transpired, he reported the attorney to the state bar disciplinary authorities. Could the attorney, as an inexperienced new associate at Big Firm, be subject to discipline for this matter?
Yes, because the attorney had a duty to consult with the friend who was the named defendant in the case before negotiating the terms of the dismissal with the prosecutor.
Yes, regardless of the directions the attorney received from the partner at Big Firm or from the client, he is subject to discipline for failing to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure was necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.
No, because the attorney acted in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty
No, the attorney tried to bring his claimed ethical dilemma to the partner for his advice, and the partner failed to provide adequate guidance to the respondent.
An attorney works exclusively as a contract lawyer for other firms that need extra help for big cases, whether in pre-trial document review or in background research and writing of briefs. She has no direct contact with the clients of these firms, and she does not participate in important decisions about any of the matters for which she performs legal tasks. Can the attorney avoid being be subject to discipline if a firm uses her contract work in a way that constitutes misconduct, either regarding clients or before a tribunal, assuming she either knows or could have known about the misconduct?
Yes, because she is not an employee of the firm and therefore cannot control how the firm uses her legal work product.
Yes, if her contract with the firm includes a provision in which the firm takes full responsibility for misconduct, malpractice, or ethical violations.
No, a contract lawyer has a duty to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Professional Conduct, notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.
No, if the clients in the matters agree that they will not hold her responsible for the work product she contributes to their representation.
An attorney who had only recently graduated from law school, and she received a job offer from a newly elected County Attorney, after volunteering for his campaign. The new attorney did not directly handle cases but assisted trial lawyers with clerical work and non-legal tasks, such as creating public service announcements for websites, social media, and press interviews. The County Attorney soon began a series of highly publicized attacks, including lawsuits and investigations, against political rivals on the County Board and County Courts. At one point, the County Attorney decided to file a federal civil racketeering lawsuit against several of the County Board members. There was no factual support for the allegations. When all the other lawyers in the office refused to be involved in the matter, the County Attorney assigned the case to the new attorney, who had no trial experience, and who was completely unfamiliar with the racketeering statute or case law. She took the case enthusiastically because she was eager to prove herself to the County Attorney; she even tried to amend the complaint to add additional racketeering charges, which were merely duplicative of the existing frivolous charges. She also filed several preemptive pre-trial motions seeking to qualify her expert witnesses and suppress evidence the defendants might try to submit. The court denied the motion to amend the complaint and dismissed the original complaint for having no basis in fact or law. The judge took the additional step of filing a grievance with the state bar against the attorney. In her hearing before the disciplinary committee, the attorney claimed that she was too inexperienced to know that the racketeering charges in her case had no basis in fact or law, and that she merely deferred to the guidance and instructions of the County Attorney. Could she be subject to discipline despite these mitigating factors?
Yes, because she had no trial experience and knew she could not have handled a complex racketeering case competently.
Yes, regardless of the directions of her superiors or her inexperience, she had a duty not to bring a frivolous proceeding or assert a frivolous issue in litigation.
No, because a lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar; even a newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with extensive experience.
No, a subordinate lawyer does not violate the ethical rules she acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.
An attorney works for a mid-size law firm that employs two or three law students every year as summer associates. The manager of the student associates assigns one of them to work on the attorney’s pending antitrust case, in addition to assignments for other lawyers at the firm. While researching a central issue in the case, the summer associate discovered an older Supreme Court decision that was unfavorable to their client. The summer associate decided not to tell anyone about the case, as the opposing party seemed to have overlooked it in their briefs. The attorney was not aware of any of this until they were on a break during their hearing. The hearing was going well for their side, and the associate boasted to the attorney about “burying” that Supreme Court case he had found. The attorney said, “Well, you should have told me about it at the time, but there is no point in bringing it up now, as it appears opposing counsel overlooked it and the hearing is going our way.” The judge’s clerks, however, found the case, and the judge queried the lawyers about how they could have missed it. Opposing counsel admitted he had been negligent in doing legal research on the matter, and the attorney recounted the story about the summer associate hiding the case from him. Is the attorney now subject to discipline for what the summer associate did?
Yes, because lawyers are automatically liable for the misconduct of nonlawyer employees at their firm; the lawyer had an affirmative duty to find the case himself and disclose it.
Yes, even though he was unaware of the violation at the time, the attorney ratified the summer associate’s conduct after he learned about it.
No, because the attorney did not know about the associate’s conduct at the time it occurred, or while submitting briefs, or even when the hearing began.
No, because opposing counsel was negligent in failing to research the issue, and if he had, he would have been likely to discover the case on his own.
An attorney hired Receptionist because of her good looks and because her brother was in the attorney’s college fraternity, but he did not check into her background at all or ask for references. Receptionist had access to all files, records, and accounts in the firm, and three months later, there arose a problem with funds missing from client trust accounts. Circumstantial evidence pointed to Receptionist as the culprit, and at this point the attorney learns that Receptionist has an arrest record for theft and embezzlement on several occasions in the past. The attorney lectures Receptionist about it but allows her to keep her job because nobody can prove her guilty - the firm does not keep the type of records that would enable anyone to prove where the missing funds went. When additional complaints arise over misappropriated client trust funds, would the attorney be subject to discipline?
Yes, because he was negligent in the hiring and supervision of nonlawyer employees.
Yes, because lawyers face strict liability (automatic responsibility) for misappropriations of client trust funds.
No, because it is implausible that the attorney could have known about the arrest record of someone merely interviewing for a receptionist position, and there is still no way to prove that Receptionist actually stole the money.
No, because Receptionist is not a lawyer and therefore not subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
A certain attorney is a fifth-year associate at a large national law firm. As a senior associate, the attorney can attend business meetings of the firm, but cannot vote on any decisions. The attorney is aware that the firm has no measures in effect that would give reasonable assurance that the paralegals are observing the confidentiality and conflict of interest rules that are part of the professional obligations of lawyers. The attorney mistakenly believes, however, that the rules apply only to the lawyers in the firm, not to the clerical staff of paralegals. When a paralegal in a separate practice group from the attorney violates the rules and the state disciplinary authority investigates the firm’s ethical compliance measures, will the attorney be subject to discipline?
Yes, because any attorney with enough seniority to attend firm business meetings with the partners has shared responsibility to ensure that measures are in effect to keep the paralegals in compliance with the rules.
No, because the attorney is not a partner nor in a comparable managerial position to implement such measures, nor does it appear that the paralegal was under the attorney’s direct supervision
Yes, because the attorney is aware that the firm has no measures in effect that would give reasonable assurance that the paralegals are observing the confidentiality and conflict of interest rules
No, because the attorney honestly believed that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not apply to the paralegals, and therefore falls under the good-faith exception to the rule.
An attorney employs an experienced legal assistant to manage administrative matters in the firm, including the client trust accounts. The attorney provided the legal assistant with detailed instructions about client trust accounts, including the specific kinds of records to keep, what funds to deposit there, and under what circumstances to withdraw funds. The attorney also sent the legal assistant to attend CLE courses and workshops on IOLTA accounts and managing firm records. Due to the legal assistant’s thorough training, competence, and experience, the attorney reviewed the client account books cursorily once a year during the annual review of the employee. Eventually, an audit by the state disciplinary authority revealed numerous discrepancies in the bookkeeping regarding the IOLTA accounts and some prohibited commingling of client funds with the firm’s funds. The attorney had no actual knowledge of the discrepancies or problems regarding the client trust accounts. Is the attorney subject to discipline?
Yes, because the attorney must manage all client trust accounts personally and cannot delegate such matters to support staff at the firm.
Yes, because the attorney did not make reasonable efforts to ensure that the legal assistant’s conduct was compatible with the professional obligations of a lawyer.
No, because the attorney made reasonable efforts to ensure that the legal assistant’s conduct was compatible with the professional obligations of a lawyer by providing extensive training and periodic reviews.
No, because the attorney lacked actual knowledge of the discrepancies, and the legal assistant is not subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
An attorney was part of a partnership before he died. He left his nephew as his sole heir. The partnership agreement, as written, provides that the firm should pay the certain amounts to the nephew. Those amounts are $210,000, for the attorney’s share of the firm's assets; a $500,000 death benefit, provided for all shareholders in the partnership; and $17,500 for fees that the attorney earned on recent cases, but had not yet received. Under the Model Rules, which of the following represents the most that the firm may properly pay to the decedent's nephew?
Only the $210,000 for the attorney’s share of the firm's assets.
$727,500, for the attorney’s share of the firm's assets, his of uncollected fees, and the death benefit
Only $17,500 for the attorney’s uncollected fees.
Only $500,000 for the death benefit, as death benefits come under a special exception under the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Attorney Barrett was the managing partner at a small law firm. Barrett hired Cooper, an ordained minister who had been unemployed, as a legal assistant at the firm. Cooper’s main job at the firm, however, was to bring in new clients. Cooper received a minimum-wage base salary, but also received large bonuses for bringing in clients who generated fees for the firm, and the combined bonuses each year exceeded $100,000. The firm paid for Cooper to complete a certification course to become a hospital chaplain, which gave Cooper chaplain’s access to emergency areas of hospitals to visit accident victims and their families. He would offer to pray with them, but he would also give them a business card from Barrett’s firm. In this way, Cooper brought several high-payoff personal injury clients to the firm. Cooper also recruited clients from the local church where he served as a “biblical counselor.” Is it proper for the firm to pay Cooper bonuses for bringing fee-generating clients to the firm?
Yes, because Cooper is merely recommending the firm to individuals he meets while conducting his ministry activities.
Yes, because Cooper is doing recruiting clients as an employee of the firm, under the direct supervision of Attorney Barrett.
No, the arrangement constitutes an improper sharing of fees with a nonlawyer
No, because it is unethical to use Cooper’s chaplain status to gain access to hospital patients and their families.
An attorney could not find a full-time job after law school, so instead he works on a contract basis for other firms. The attorney also signs up with a legal temp-work agency, a company owned by nonlawyers that places lawyers in temporary assignments at law firms that need an extra associate on a short-term basis. Law firms contact the legal temp-work agency when they need lawyers for a special project or assignment, and the agency sends them several resumes from which to choose the temporary associates they want. Through this temp-work agency, the attorney receives a three-month assignment at Big Firm conducting document review as part of litigation discovery. The firm pays the attorney $75 per hour, and it pays the temp-work agency a placement fee of 7% on whatever the attorney earns. Big Firm, in turn, passes the attorney’s $100/hour fees and the 7% placement fee through to its clients as an item on the client’s bill. Is this arrangement proper?
It is proper for Big Firm to pay the placement fee to the agency, to pass the fees through to the clients, and to pay the attorney’s hourly rate out of the fees it receives from clients
It is proper for Big Firm to hire the attorney on an hourly, short-term contract basis and to pass his fees through to the client, but it is improper for Big Firm to pay the temp-work agency a percentage, as this constitutes sharing legal fees with the nonlawyers who own the temp-work agency.
It is proper for Big Firm to pay the attorney and the temp-work agency, but it is improper for Big Firm to pass the costs through to their clients.
It is proper for Big Firm to pay a temp-work agency and to pass these costs through to the clients, but it is improper for the attorney to work on a case on an hourly-fee basis without becoming an associate at Big Firm.
After a long, distinguished career as a solo practitioner in a major city, an elderly attorney agrees to join a newer law firm on the condition that the firm would pay $1000 per month after the attorney’s death to his sister, who is 74 years old, until her death. The attorney’s sister is not a lawyer. The firm agrees to this arrangement, in addition to making the attorney a partner with a 15% share in the firm. Is this arrangement proper?
Yes, because it is the payment of money over a reasonable period after the lawyer’s death to a specified person.
Yes, because the Contracts Clause of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of contract, so lawyers and firms can make whatever compensation arrangements they want.
No, because the sister is not a lawyer and therefore cannot share in the legal fees received by the firm.
No, because payments that continue until the sister’s death could go on indefinitely, and this goes beyond the Model Rules’ stipulation of “a reasonable period of time.”
An attorney agrees to buy the successful law firm of a fellow lawyer who recently succumbed to terminal cancer. The sale includes the office building, the library and furnishings, and the good will of the firm, and conforms to the provisions of Rule 1.7. The purchasing attorney pays $100,000, the agreed-upon purchase price, to the executor of the deceased lawyer’s estate, but the executor is not a lawyer. The funds for the purchase came from the contingent fees in a recent personal injury case won by the purchasing attorney. Was this transaction improper?
Yes, because the attorney is sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer, the executor.
Yes, because the funds for the purchase came from a contingent-fee case.
No, because an attorney purchasing the firm of a deceased lawyer may pay the executor the agreed-upon purchase price.
No, because even a nonlawyer executor of a firm functions temporarily in the role of a lawyer for purposes of the Model Rules.
Three law partners have decided to incorporate their firm instead of continuing as a partnership, as their malpractice insurer has offered them a lower rate on their premiums if they incorporate and thereby reduce some of their joint liability. They also want to make a clearer track for associates to become shareholders after reaching certain performance benchmarks. The articles of incorporation provide that when a shareholder dies, a fiduciary representative of the estate may hold stock in the corporation for a reasonable time during administration of the estate before transferring it to the heirs. Which of the following may the partners properly do as they incorporate?
They may incorporate their law practice and convey an interest in the corporation to their heirs, such as spouses or children.
They may stipulate that the corporation will hold all funds in a single operating account, and thereby avoid holding client funds in separate IOLTA accounts.
They may provide, as stated, that when a shareholder dies, a fiduciary representative of the estate may hold stock in the corporation for a reasonable time during administration of the estate before cashing out the shares and transferring the funds to the heirs.
They may not have a plan whereby associates acquire shares merely by working at the firm for a certain number of years and bringing in a certain number of clients.
A church retains an attorney to challenge a new zoning regulation that would prohibit the church from constructing a new, expanded sanctuary on its property, attached to the existing church. The church cannot afford to pay the attorney, and it is seeking only a declaratory judgment (that the regulation is invalid) rather than money damages. The attorney agrees to take the case and then split any court-awarded legal fees with the church if they prevail. They win a favorable judgment; the court declares the regulation unconstitutional and awards legal fees, which the attorney shares with the church. Is the fee sharing proper?
No, because a lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer.
No, because the award of legal fees to a church violates the separation of church and state, and a lawyer is under oath to uphold the Constitution.
Yes, because a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that retains the lawyer in a matter.
Yes, assuming the attorney takes only 30% of the legal fees and does not claim a tax deduction for the 70% shared with the church.
An attorney is a licensed lawyer in a New England state, but has an office and represents clients exclusively in a southern state. The attorney confines her practice to immigration law, representing foreign-born clients in immigration hearings. A relevant federal statute permits nonlawyers to appear as representatives for immigrants when they appear before the immigration agency. Many of the attorney’s clients have applied for a spousal visa after marrying an American citizen, and some clients had a Notary Public from their home country or an un-ordained lay minister from their home church conduct their wedding ceremony. In addition, some were previously married and divorced in their home country, where such transactions are informal and have no official documentation. There is often some question about whether the marriage is valid under local state law, which is a prerequisite for obtaining certain types of visas. Which of the following is correct?
The attorney’s conduct is proper, because she is merely providing services authorized by federal law, which preempts state licensing requirements.
The attorney’s conduct is proper because she has specialized in immigration law, which is entirely federal and involves no questions of state law.
The attorney could be subject to discipline for the unauthorized practice of law in this southern state.
The attorney’s conduct is improper if she does not file a pro hac vice appearance in each case.
A husband and wife are both attorneys in Puerto Rico, though they attended law school in Florida. They have practiced in Puerto Rico for ten years and have a license to practice there. Last year, they moved to Florida, where the wife took the state bar exam and gained admission to the Florida bar. They have now opened a law office in Florida with both of their names listed on the firm letterhead, followed by the phrase “Attorneys at Law.” The husband confines his practice exclusively to Puerto Rican clients who are living in Florida or are visiting there; the wife handles all other legal matters. It is proper for them to use such letterhead?
Yes, because Puerto Ricans are U.S. Citizens, and they both attended an American law school.
Yes, because the husband confines his practice to Puerto Rican immigrants and visitors, whom he would be able to represent if they were back in Puerto Rico.
No, because the letterhead reveals that the wife is aiding her husband in the unauthorized practice of law.
No, because identifying themselves as law firm partners is misleading, and does not apprise readers to the fact that they are indeed married.
An attorney obtained a license to practice law in the state where she attended law school. After a few years, the attorney took a job in a neighboring state, moved there, and obtained a license to practice law in her new state. She kept her original license, in her former state, but went on inactive status there to avoid the burdensome annual bar membership fees in a state where she no longer practiced. Eventually, her new firm loses its anchor clients and recommends that the attorney drum up some new business among her former clients. Then the attorney sends letters to all her former clients in her former state, offering to represent them in any new legal matters they have, or in updating wills or contracts that she previously did for them. She travels about once per week to her home state and meets with clients in a library study room at the law school she attended. A few of her former clients refer her to friends or relatives who become new clients, and the attorney’s new employer is thrilled. Which of the following is true?
The attorney is subject to discipline for practicing law in her home state while on inactive status, but her supervising lawyer is not subject to discipline because she had a license in that state when he hired her.
Neither the attorney nor her supervising lawyer would be subject to discipline, because she merely went on inactive status in the other state, but she still holds her license there.
Only the supervising lawyer is subject to discipline, because he encouraged his subordinate to solicit out-of-state clients in a state where he is unlicensed, but the attorney can still practice law there.
Both the attorney and her supervising lawyer are subject to discipline because she is on inactive status in her home state but is soliciting clients and handling their matters there regularly.
A client retains his attorney, who has represented the client in the past, to represent him in litigation in another state, where the attorney is unlicensed. The matter requires some knowledge of the law of the state where the trial will occur. His attorney files a pro hac vice appearance in the matter, which the local court accepts, and begins preparing for trial there. The attorney and the client never discuss the particulars of filing a pro hac vice appearance; nor did they discuss why it would be necessary. The client never asked if the attorney could practice law in the other jurisdiction, and the attorney never explained the licensing requirement and that he would need permission from the court there to handle the case. Then the attorney prevailed in the matter on behalf of the client, kept his agreed-upon contingent fee, and gave the client the remaining proceeds and unused retainer funds. Which of the following is true?
The attorney is subject to discipline for accepting a contingent fee in a proceeding in another state where the attorney does not have a license to practice law.
The attorney’s conduct was proper, as the court accepted the pro hac vice appearance, and it made no difference to the client whether the attorney had a license to practice there on an ongoing basis or appeared only on a pro hac vice basis.
The attorney’s conduct was proper, assuming the attorney can acquire the necessary knowledge of local laws with a reasonable amount of study.
It was improper for the attorney to fail to disclose to the client that he was unlicensed in the other state and would need to file a pro hac vice appearance, especially given that the matter required some knowledge of local laws.
An attorney is a joint owner of a collection agency. Whenever the agency’s initial efforts to collect prove unsuccessful, the staff at the agency sends the delinquent debtor a demand letter on the attorney’s law firm letterhead, threatening to commence litigation if the matter does not reach a resolution within 30 days. The attorney authorized the staff at the agency to send these demand letters, but the attorney is too busy to review all the letters himself. The collection agency staff signs the letters on behalf of the attorney’s firm. Will the attorney be subject to discipline for authorizing these letters?
Yes, because the letter contains a specific threat of litigation and the facts do not specify whether the attorney will indeed follow through and file any claims in court.
No, because the collection agency has other owners besides the attorney, so it is not necessarily his responsibility to supervise the employees there.
No, because the staff at the collection agency are acting on the attorney’s behalf with his explicit authorization
Yes, because the attorney is merely facilitating the collection agency in the unauthorized practice of law.
An attorney hired a second-year law student as a clerk. The law student is unlicensed. The attorney has the law student perform a variety of tasks. Which of the following tasks, if performed by the law student, would mean that the attorney is subject to discipline?
Conducting online legal research and writing research memoranda.
Drafting a customized retainer agreement for the attorney to use with clients pursuing claims against a government agency
Interviewing accident witnesses and potential character witnesses; and asking them to certify the accuracy of the student's written notes.
Reaching settlement agreements with insurance companies before the attorney indeed files any lawsuit in the matter.
An experienced attorney has an office in State X, and she is duly licensed to practice law in that state. The attorney’s office is in a city on the border of State Y, and the attorney does not have a license to practice there. Over the years, some of the attorney’s clients have in fact been residents of State Y, and their legal issues sometimes involve research into the laws or judicial precedents of State Y. For the convenience of these clients, and to attract business of other clients there, the attorney rents a small office space, hires nonlawyer clerical staff, and otherwise prepares premises for the general practice of law at a branch-office location in State Y. Apart from the issues raised by opening the new branch office, was it improper for the attorney to represent residents of State Y in her office in State X?
Yes, the clients are coming to the attorney in her office in the state where she has a license to practice law.
Yes, the Supreme Court has held that the privileges and immunities clause should permit lawyers to practice across state lines.
No, the attorney is unlicensed in State Y, so she should not advise clients on matters that come under the laws of State Y.
No, because as a policy matter she is taking clients away from licensed lawyers in State Y.
An experienced attorney has an office in State X, and she is duly licensed to practice law in that state. The attorney’s office is in a city on the border of State Y, and the attorney does not have a license to practice there. Over the years, some of the attorney’s clients have in fact been residents of State Y, and their legal issues sometimes involve research into the laws or judicial precedents of State Y. For the convenience of these clients, and to attract business of other clients there, the attorney rents a small office space, hires nonlawyer clerical staff, and otherwise prepares premises for the general practice of law at a branch-office location in State Y. Is it permissible for the attorney to open the branch office in State Y?
It is permissible because she is doing so primarily for the convenience of clients whom she is already representing in the state where she has a law license.
It is impermissible because she does not have a license to practice in State Y and she has established an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law.
It is permissible because the Supreme Court has held that the privileges and immunities clause should permit lawyers to practice across state lines.
It is impermissible because the new office does not have any lawyers on staff there, and she will not be able to provide competent, diligent representation in two places at the same time.
An experienced attorney has an office in State X, and she is duly licensed to practice law in that state. The attorney’s office is in a city on the border of State Y, and the attorney does not have a license to practice there. The attorney represents a regulated utility, which operates a power plant in State X near the border with State Y. The attorney’s representation of the utility mostly pertains to environmental issues, obtaining necessary permits, and complying with federal and state regulations of utilities. Occasionally, the utility also has issues relating to compliance with the environmental and permitting laws of State Y because of those same activities. Is it permissible for the attorney to travel to State Y to deal with governmental officials regarding regulatory issues arising out of the utility's activities?
It is impermissible because the attorney is practicing law without a license in State Y.
It is impermissible because if the attorney represents one client in some matters in State Y, she must be available to represent any other within State Y who have the same legal issues there.
It is permissible because the legal issues arise out of or relate closely to the attorney’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice.
It is permissible because the Supreme Court has held that the privileges and immunities clause should permit lawyers to practice across state lines.
An experienced attorney has an office in State X, and she is duly licensed to practice law in that state. The attorney’s office is in a city on the border of State Y, and the attorney does not have a license to practice there. The attorney represents a regulated utility, which operates a power plant in State X near the border with State Y. The attorney’s original work for the utility in State X related to rate-setting proceedings before a utility commission in that state, and before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). New legislative changes now permit the utility to make retail sales of electricity to consumers in multiple states. Given the attorney’s extensive knowledge of the utility's rate-related financial information, the utility asks the attorney to handle its new rate applications in several other states, but in none of these states does the attorney have a license to practice law. The attorney’s work in those matters would frequently require her presence for legal activities in each of the other states until the new rate work is complete. Is it permissible for the attorney to conduct those activities in the other states on behalf of the utility?
It is impermissible because if the attorney represents one client in some matters in State Y, she must be available to represent any other within State Y who have the same legal issues there.
It is impermissible because the attorney is practicing law without a license in State Y.
It is permissible because the Supreme Court has held that the privileges and immunities clause should permit lawyers to practice across state lines.
It is permissible because the legal issues arise out of or relate to the attorney’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer has a license to practice.
An attorney wants to retire from practice due to a chronic illness, and he decides to sell his practice to another lawyer. The sale agreement complies with the Model Rules regarding the sale of a law practice. As part of the sale agreement, however, the attorney stipulates that he will not resume the practice of law in that jurisdiction, even if medical breakthroughs cure his chronic illness and restore him to perfect health. The purchaser of the firm is aware that research for a cure of the attorney’s illness is well underway, and he is concerned because it is foreseeable that the attorney would recover and want to return to the practice of law in a few years. Is it proper for the attorney and his buyer to include this provision of the sales agreement for the law firm?
Yes, because the rule against restrictions on the right to practice does not apply to the sale of a law practice.
No, because a lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice.
No, because a lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement.
Yes, because the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution would prohibit a state from restricting the right for a lawyer to include certain contract provisions in a sale agreement.
An attorney agrees to join a new firm as one of its shareholders, and to merge his practice with that of the new firm. The shareholder agreement includes a provision that if the attorney retires from the firm and begins collecting the firm’s retirement benefits, he cannot practice law with another firm, government entity, or as a solo practitioner. Otherwise, the agreement stipulates, the attorney will forfeit the retirement benefits. The firm is concerned that the attorney will want to represent clients occasionally in his retirement, and that he may steal some clients from the firm. Is this agreement proper?
No, because prohibiting a lawyer from practicing after retiring from the firm is a restriction on the right of the lawyer to practice, in violation of the Model Rules.
No, because the intent is to keep the attorney from “poaching” clients, and thus limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer.
Yes, because the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution would prohibit a state from restricting the right for a lawyer to include certain contract provisions in a sale agreement.
Yes, because the rule against restrictions on the right to practice have an exception for agreements concerning benefits upon retirement.
Big Bank hires outside counsel to handle its mortgage foreclosure cases against borrowers who are in default. An attorney agrees to handle a matter for Big Bank, but the engagement contract between the attorney and Big Bank specifies that the attorney may not represent clients in the future who have adversarial claims against Big Bank, and that the attorney agrees to disqualification in any case in which Big Bank would be the opposing party in litigation. The attorney recognized that this term would be unenforceable in court, and he accepted the appointment as outside counsel. Were the attorney’s actions improper, under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct?
Yes, because the attorney has entered into an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.
Yes, because the attorney has entered into an employment agreement that restricts his right to represent future clients who sue Big Bank or whom Big Bank sues.
No, because courts consistently hold such clauses to be unenforceable, so the attorney has not agreed to an actual restriction on his right to practice.
No, because this is not an employment agreement with a law firm or partnership, nor is the attorney agreeing to the term to help settle another client’s case.
An attorney specializes in helping his business clients obtain business loans from commercial lenders. While assisting one client in obtaining an unusually large commercial loan from Big Bank, the attorney noticed a clause in the loan contract by which the borrower promised that its attorney would not seek to obtain similar loans for other parties from Big Bank’s primary market competitor in that state. The clause required evidence of a contractual agreement by the attorney – whether with Big Bank or with the client – to this effect. The client desperately needed the loan to survive a temporary downturn in its own industry, and the attorney could easily direct future clients to this same lender, Big Bank, to obtain loans on comparable terms to what the competitor bank offered. In fact, most of the attorney’s clients ended up getting their financing through Big Bank, and only rarely had the attorney succeeded in securing loans for clients through the competitor. The contract provision seemed harmless to the attorney, though it would be enforceable. Is it proper for the attorney to sign off on these loan documents for this client, including this clause in the contract?
Yes, because the attorney has a fiduciary duty to consider the client’s best interests before the personal interests of the attorney or the attorney’s potential future clients.
Yes, because the bank is the party to the contract that includes the provision in question, not the attorney.
No, because an attorney must not make an agreement restricting the attorney’s right to practice.
No, because the provision is clearly an illegal action against the competitor bank.
Big Bank routinely hired lawyers as outside counsel on various matters, and it required each one to sign an Outside Counsel Agreement (OCG) as part of its contract of engagement for legal representation. Big Bank’s OCG included the following provision:
Notwithstanding the rules and opinions set forth in ABA or state ethical opinions, regulations, or cases applicable to outside counsel, outside counsel agrees to treat Big Bank and all its subsidiaries as one entity for analyzing conflicts of interest. Big Bank will ordinarily give informed consent, confirmed in writing, to waive conflicts in transactional matters, whenever the bank’s interests will not be impaired. For conflicts of interest, Big Bank shall include all organizations and entities delineated in the attached APPENDIX, which Big Bank may amend at any time.
An attorney has an opportunity to work as outside counsel for Big Bank on a specific matter, but she is concerned about this provision. Would it be proper for the attorney to accept this OCG by contractual agreement?
Yes, even though the OCG provision goes beyond the requirements of the Model Rules for conflicts screening, lawyers may contractually agree to such limitations on their practice.
Yes, because the OCG provision merely reflects the duties already imposed on lawyers by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and similar state codes.
No, because this agreement impermissibly restrains the attorney’s right to practice.
No, because the entities relevant for conflicts of interest screening must not be subject to change after the representation begins.
Conglomerate Corporation routinely hires outside counsel for representation on legal matters, and it requires the lawyers to sign an Outside Counsel Agreement (OCG) that contains the following provision: ATTORNEY agrees not to represent any party adverse to CONGLOMERATE CORP., or any entity in the APPENDIX, without prior written consent. In no event may ATTORNEY represent an adverse party against CONGLOMERATE in litigation. The APPENDIX contains a confidential list of entities ATTORNEY must use in screening for conflicts. The APPENDIX includes some entities that may be affiliated with CONGLOMERATE’s parent companies, as well as entities that may not be controlled by CNOGLOMERATE or its parent companies, but in which they may have an ownership interest.
Would it be improper for an attorney to enter into this agreement, if it includes this OCG provision?
Yes, because the OCG provision creates an impermissible restraint on the attorney’s right to practice law.
Yes, because attorneys may not enter into any OCG agreements when serving as outside counsel.
No, because lawyers are free to include contractual obligations to their clients that go beyond the normal duties found in the Model Rules.
No, because the provision merely reflects the duties already set forth in the Model Rules for conflicts of interest.
Conglomerate Corporation offered to hire an attorney as outside counsel for a specific legal matter. Conglomerate’s OCG (outside counsel agreement) with all outside lawyers it hires includes the following provision: ATTORNEY agrees that it would constitute an impermissible conflict of interest to represent a significant competitor of CONGLOMERATE CORP. or its subsidiaries or affiliates. The APPENDIX attached to this document includes a list of CONGLOMERATE CORP. subsidiaries. Before ATTORNEY’S representation begins, ATTORNEY must disclose in writing the names of any national or regional retailers or any significant competitors of CONGLOMERATE CORP. or its subsidiaries or affiliates that ATTORNEY represents, as well as a general description of the type of representation that ATTORNEY’S firm provides to such client(s).
Is it proper for Conglomerate’s in-house counsel to require outside counsel to agree to this provision in the OCG?
Yes, even though the OCG provision goes beyond the requirements of the Model Rules for conflicts screening, lawyers may contractually agree to such limitations on their practice.
Yes, because the OCG provision merely reflects the duties already imposed on lawyers by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and similar state codes.
No, because only the Board of Directors can request that outside counsel sign an OCG, not in-house counsel.
No, because this agreement impermissibly restrains the attorney’s right to practice.
An attorney worked as in-house counsel at Conglomerate Corporation. Her employment agreement with Conglomerate Corporation that she would not, following her employment there, represent any client in litigation against Conglomerate. General Counsel for Conglomerate maintained that this was necessary to prevent lawyers who left there from using confidential information they learned during their time at Conglomerate against the company in litigation thereafter. In other words, the contractual provision merely mirrored the duties a lawyer in that situation would have under the conflicts of interest rules. Would this agreement be enforceable, if the attorney left Conglomerate Corporation and then represented a client who had a contract claim against the company?
Yes, because the agreement could be binding as a matter of contract law, even if it somehow violated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Yes, because the agreement does not restrict the attorney’s ability to practice law or represent clients, it merely reflects the conflict of interest rules that prohibit a lawyer from switching sides in litigation.
No, the agreement places an impermissible restriction on the attorney’s ability to practice law, and it goes beyond the constraints of the conflict of interest rules.
No, because the agreement was between two lawyers, and the future client was not a party to the contract.
An attorney worked as in-house counsel at Conglomerate Corporation. Conglomerate had a problem with lawyers who left its legal department to work for its suppliers – the lawyers would contact their friends who still worked for Conglomerate to solicit additional supply contracts, or to negotiate more favorable terms on existing contracts. Worse, the lawyers could also make strategic use of their knowledge of Conglomerate’s internal procurement practices (such as the time of year when certain major supplier contracts were up for renewal). General Counsel for Conglomerate started including in its contracts with all new in-house counsel a prohibition on departing lawyers who work for Conglomerate’s corporate vendors, either as in-house counsel or with a law firm representing the vendor, from contacting any of Conglomerate’s employees. Is this agreement proper, under the Model Rules?
Yes, because it does not restrict the departing lawyers’ ability to practice law, but merely protects against vendors using unfair competition methods to obtain or manipulate their contracts with Conglomerate.
Yes, because it does not restrict the departing lawyers’ ability to represent clients who want to sue Conglomerate, or even from working for Conglomerate’s major corporate customers.
No, because it is overbroad, and interferes with the departing employees’ ability to continue their friendships or personal relationships with other employees at Conglomerate, even for non-legal contact.
No, the agreement imposes an impermissible restriction on lawyers’ ability to practice law.
An attorney represented a plaintiff in a claim against Conglomerate Corporation and was remarkably effective in her efforts, mostly because she hired Professor Stevenson as an expert witness. After the deposition of Stevenson, Conglomerate realized they needed to settle the case before trial. Conglomerate offered a very generous settlement to the plaintiff, including the full amount the plaintiff sought as recovery in its pleadings, plus reasonable attorney’s fees, and even some additional stock options in Conglomerate Corporation. Conditions of the settlement included a waiver and release of all the plaintiff’s claims, including potential claims not part of this lawsuit, and an agreement by the attorney never to use Professor Stevenson again as an expert witness in a case against Conglomerate. The settlement imposed no other restraints on the attorney, and it did not restrain Professor Stevenson from serving as a fact witness (as opposed to expert) in the future. Assume for this question that Professor Stevenson is not a licensed attorney in this jurisdiction. Is this agreement proper, under the Model Rules?
Yes, because it did not impose any restraint on the attorney’s ability or right to practice law, but merely restricted a non-lawyer expert witness from testifying again against a specific defendant.
Yes, because if the client exercised her stock options, the attorney would not be able to represent her in an action against Conglomerate again anyway, due to the conflict of interest rules, rendering moot any other restraints on the attorney’s practice of law.
No, because even limiting the attorney’s ability to use a specific expert witness against this defendant would be an impermissible restriction on the attorney’s ability to practice law.
No, because the agreement includes a waiver and release of potential claims by the plaintiff that the lawyer has not yet brought, which would be an impermissible restraint on the attorney’s freedom to practice law.
An attorney made a lateral move to Small Firm. The managing partner had the attorney sign an employment contract on his first day, which included a provision under which the attorney agreed that upon leaving employment, he would pay his former employer ninety-five percent of any attorney fees earned in a contingent-fee settlement from any Small Firm clients who might follow the attorney when he left. The attorney worked for Small Firm for seven years, then left to start his own practice. Before the attorney left Small Firm, however, he had begun representation of a client who was an accident victim, and the client choose to follow the attorney to his new firm, to continue the representation. The attorney eventually obtained a generous settlement for the client; the attorney’s contingent fee was one-third of the award, after deducting fees and expenses. The managing partner immediately notified the attorney that he had a contractual obligation to pay Small Firm ninety-five percent of the fee from the settlement, and notified the defendant’s insurer, that it should send its check to Small Firm as the loss payee rather than the attorney’s new firm. What is the proper result in this case?
The insurer should send the check to the attorney at his new firm as the loss payee, and the attorney should then send his former employer, Small Firm, ninety-five percent of his one-third, after fees and expenses.
The insurer should send the check to Small Firm as the loss payee, as Small Firm initiated the claim, and Small Firm should then send disburse two-thirds to the original client, after deducting costs and expenses, and five percent of the remaining one-third to the attorney.
The insurer should send the check to the attorney’s new firm as loss payee, and the attorney should send no money at all to Small Firm.
The insurer should send the check to the client as loss payee, and the client cover outstanding bills for costs and expenses, and then should give ninety-five percent of one third to Small Firm, and the remainder to the attorney.
An attorney brought a class action lawsuit against Conglomerate Corporation and was remarkably effective in her efforts, mostly because she was brilliant about forum shopping. After discovery, Conglomerate realized they needed to settle the case before trial. Conglomerate offered a very generous settlement to the plaintiff class, including the full amount sought as recovery in the pleadings, plus reasonable attorney’s fees. Conditions of the settlement included a nondisclosure agreement about the terms of the settlement, and an agreement with this attorney limiting venue and forum options in future cases against Conglomerate brought by non-settling plaintiffs. The settlement imposed no other restraints on the attorney. Assume that the attorney did not care anymore about forum and venue, because she had learned enough about Conglomerate Corporation’s activities that she thought she could easily win future cases in any court. Is this agreement proper, under the Model Rules?
Yes, because it did not impose any restraint on the attorney’s ability or right to practice law, but merely functioned as a forum selection clause in a contract.
Yes, because the attorney knew that she could win future cases regardless of the forum or venue.
No, because even limiting the attorney’s ability to shop for forum or venue in future cases for other plaintiffs would be an impermissible restriction on the attorney’s ability to practice law.
No, because the plaintiff cannot agree to settlement conditions that might affect other plaintiffs who have not yet settled their claims.
Conglomerate Corporation was a defendant in multidistrict litigation, and a plaintiff’s attorney represented many different plaintiffs in these related cases against Conglomerate. The attorney and Conglomerate reached a settlement agreement for one group of claimants. The settlement was generous toward those plaintiffs, but it included an agreement by the attorney to withdraw as counsel from representing the other plaintiffs in related cases who had not yet settled their claims. Is the attorney correct in believing it would be improper to sign this agreement with this group of plaintiffs?
Yes, because it creates a nonconsentable conflict of interest between the different plaintiffs the attorney represents.
Yes, because the agreement would be an impermissible restriction on the right to practice law.
No, but only if the attorney returns any unused portion of the fees those clients have already paid.
No, because withdrawing from representing clients whose claims have already gone forward does not constitute a future restriction on the right to practice law.
An attorney represented a plaintiff in a wrongful death case arising out of a prison riot, which included many claims and crossclaims. The case ended in settlement. The defendant’s settlement offer included two conditions: first, the commonplace requirement that the attorney and client not disclose the amount of the settlement; and second, that the attorney give defendant counsel her entire file to keep under seal, meaning the attorney could not keep copies of her own work product in the case. She would have to turn over her own personal notes and internal memoranda in the file from her interns and associates. Would it be proper for the attorney to agree to this as a condition of a large monetary settlement for her client?
Yes, because turning over the file from one completed case places no restrictions on a lawyer’s future practice of law.
Yes, because it is in the best interest of the client to accept the settlement, and work product from one case would have no value in future unrelated cases.
No, because it violates the Model Rules to keep a file under seal.
No because forfeiting the attorney’s own work product in the case could restrict her future practice of law in similar cases.
An attorney represents a large corporate defendant in a tort action over a defective product line. The current action is the first of what may be many such lawsuits, but the problems with its product line have not received any media attention yet, so the company decides to settle the matter quietly. Recognizing that he has a duty to protect the legal interests of his client, the attorney asks for three conditions in the settlement. First, the plaintiff agrees to a waiver and release of this and any other claims arising out of the use of this product, at least up to that time. Second, the plaintiff and the attorney must agree not to disclose the settlement amount to anyone. Third, the plaintiff’s lawyer must agree not to use any information learned in the current representation in any future representation against the corporate defendant, whether in litigation or transactional matters. The attorney recognizes that there can be no restrictions placed on the lawyers right to practice law, so he does not ask the lawyer to refrain from representing other plaintiffs against the corporation, but only that the information from this case not carry over into other unrelated cases. The attorney also points out to opposing counsel that the conflict of interest rules would already prohibit the attorney from using any information learned in a representation against the client. Similarly, the confidentiality rule forbids the disclosure (without the client’s consent) of confidential information learned from any source during the representation. Thus, the condition in the settlement overlaps with other disclosure restraints that the Model Rules impose on the other lawyer. Opposing counsel is a notorious plaintiff’s lawyer in that region, receiving frequent reprimanded for ethical violations from the state bar. The lawyer has a reputation for bringing up irrelevant but inflammatory evidence from other cases in his trials, telling the jury, “You wouldn’t believe what this same company did to my other client!” It seemed appropriate, therefore, to the attorney for this defendant to ask for settlement conditions that recognize this lawyer’s previous bad behavior. Is the attorney correct?
Yes, given the other lawyer’s history, it is proper to ask for a settlement condition in which he agrees not to use information from this case in other cases.
Yes, assuming the client also agrees to this condition, and the condition is not adverse to any legal or financial interest of either party in the case.
No, prohibiting the disclosure of the settlement amount functions as an impermissible restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice, because he cannot inform other potential plaintiffs about how much they might obtain in their own lawsuits.
No, prohibiting the lawyer from using any information learned in the representation is an impermissible restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice.
An attorney in a small partnership decided it was time to retire. The partnership agreement had clear provisions for the retirement of partners, in which the partnership would buy out the retirement partner’s share, including an hourly prorated amount for work on matters that were still pending and had not yet generated divisible fees. The retirement provisions also provided a substantial pension for the retiring partner, purchase of a single-term life insurance policy, and separate payments from an annuity. A condition of these retirement benefits was that the partner permanently leave the practice of law. Is this condition proper?
Yes, because restrictions on the right to practice law are permissible as a condition of retirement benefits.
Yes, this condition would be proper even if the attorney was not retiring because partnerships are a special exception to the usual rule against restrictions on the right to practice law.
No, because this constitutes an impermissible restriction on the attorney’s right to do pro bono cases in his retirement.
No, because retirement provisions that force lawyers to leave the practice of law are de facto age discrimination, reducing the number of older, more experienced lawyers from the legal profession.
An attorney practices personal injury law, representing plaintiffs on a contingent fee basis. The attorney employs a paralegal to assist with preparing documents for litigation. The paralegal's salary arrangement is 10 percent of the firm's total new revenue each year. In years when the attorney wins several large cases, the paralegal receives higher wages, and in years when the attorney has no big wins, the paralegal receives almost nothing. The paralegal does not bring clients to the firm, and does not participate in judgments about which clients to represent, or about how to handle the cases. Is the attorney subject to discipline for this arrangement?
Yes, unless the paralegal has a law degree and has obtained a law license in another state.
No, because non-lawyers may participate in a firm compensation plan based on overall profit sharing.
Yes, because the paralegal here is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
No, because the rules treat paralegals the same as lawyers for purposes of sharing fees or profits.
An attorney practices personal injury law, representing plaintiffs on a contingent fee basis. The attorney employs a paralegal to assist with preparing documents for litigation. The paralegal's salary arrangement is 10 percent of the firm's total net revenue each year. In years when the attorney wins several large cases, the paralegal receives higher wages, and in years when the attorney has no big wins, the paralegal receives almost nothing. The paralegal does not bring clients to the firm, but does participate in judgments about which clients to represent, how to structure contingent fee arrangements, and how much to seek in damages after a verdict, as these matters directly affect the paralegal's income as well as the attorney's. Is the attorney subject to discipline for this arrangement?
Yes, unless the paralegal has a law degree and is admitted in another state
No, because non-lawyers may participate in a firm compensation plan based on overall profit sharing.
Yes, because a non-lawyer has a right to influence the professional judgment of the lawyer under this arrangement.
No, because the rules treat paralegals the same as lawyers for purposes of sharing fees or profits.
An attorney in a state that has adopted the Model Rules in their current form enters into a fee-sharing agreement with a lawyer admitted in Washington, D.C., which permits fee sharing with non-lawyers and multidisciplinary practices. They collaborate on a case and divide the fees as agreed. The attorney from the Model Rules state is aware that the other attorney will share his part of the fees with non-lawyers in the DC office; in fact, the DC lawyer's firm has accountants who hold an ownership share in that firm. Is the non DC attorney subject to discipline for indirectly sharing legal fees with non lawyers, given that he practices in a state that forbids fee sharing with non-lawyers?
Yes, the attorneys have a duty to uphold the rules in their own jurisdiction, and given that the attorney knows that the other lawyer will share some of the fees with non lawyers, he has violated the rule in his own state.
Yes, but only because the lawyer had actual knowledge of the fee-sharing arrangement
No, as long as the first attorney shares fees only with another attorney, it does not matter if the other attorney shares fees with non lawyers as permitted by his home jurisdiction.
No, because the rules in the attorney's own state, prohibiting fee sharing with non lawyers, is unconstitutional, according to the supreme court.
The attorney hires a nationally known Internet marketing specialist, a tech guru, to help develop the firm's reputation and attract new clients. The Internet specialist has made millions on previous tech startups, while the attorney is relatively unknown and has been practicing for only two years. the tech guru demands a certain terms in the contract that require the attorney to confer with the tech guru about accepting clients that were former clients of the tech guru, in order to avoid conflicts of interest. the attorney must also clear any litigation positions approaches or strategies that pertain to intellectual property or Internet marketing liability with the tech guru to avoid positions that would jeopardize the guru's other business. is the attorney subject to discipline for this arrangement?
No, because the attorney is merely hiring an advertising specialist and can pay normal rates for such services.
no, because the contract merely reflects the lawyers duty under the model rules to avoid conflicts of interest between current clients.
Yes, because a non lawyer has a contractual right to direct or control the professional judgment of the lawyer.
yes, because the attorney is advertising online which means Internet users in other states can see the firms advertisements and offers of representation even though the attorney does not have a license to practice in most of those jurisdictions.
A firm specializing in sports law represented several professional athletes as clients. The state disciplinary authorities suspended and eventually disbarred one of the associates at the firm, but the disciplinary action did not implicate the rest of the firm (the lawyer's misconduct had occured completely outside the scope of his duties there). the firm retained the disbarred lawyer as a sports agent for some of the athletes who were clients of the firm. the disbarred lawyer would draft contracts for the athletes and negotiate deals for the firm's clients with their sports teams or with companies seeking the athletes product endorsement. could the partners at the firm be subject to discipline for facilitating the disbarred lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law?
yes, because a firm may never have any business dealings with a disbarred attorney.
yes, because the disbarred lawyer is engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by drafting and negotiating contracts for the firm's clients.
no, because the firm is not representing that the disbarred lawyer is an attorney and the agent does not have his own clients.
no, because the disbarred attorney is working under the supervision of licensed attorneys.
In anticipation of a hearing before a federal agency in Washington DC an attorney travels to a Washington suburb in Virginia from her own state to meet with her client (from her home state), interview witnesses, and review relevant documents. the attorney makes weekly trips there over the course of a year and spends most of her work week there each time (four or five days), as the agency hearing pertains to a complex antitrust matter. the attorney solicits no new clients there but works only on the matter for the client from her home state but is nonetheless unlicensed in Virginia. is the attorneys conduct proper?
Yes, the rules pertaining to unauthorized practice of law do not apply to any federal agency hearings.
no, because her activity there continued for a full year and therefore is not temporary so she is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
no, because she is spending more time there than in her home state where she holds a license despite this being a temporary arrangement.
yes, because a lawyer rendering services in a foreign jurisdiction on a temporary basis does not violate the rules merely by engaging in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice law.
An attorney hires 3 new associates upon on their graduation from law school in a neighboring state. The associates passed the bar in the neighboring state but they're still unlicensed in the attorneys state. The associates confined their work to conducting research reviewing documents and attending meetings with witnesses in support of the attorney who is responsible for all the litigation. The research done by the associates however is far beyond the capabilities of a paralegal or a typical law student associate. Is the attorney subject discipline for this arrangement?
yes, because the attorney has facilitated the unauthorized practice of law by the associates.
no, because the associates are licensed in a neighboring state which presumably has similar laws and precedents.
yes, because the attorney is relying on research done by lawyers unlicensed in that jurisdiction.
no, because he associates merely conduct delegated work under the attorney's supervision for which the attorney is ultimately responsible.
Attorney has a firm in a state in which the attorney lacks a license to practice law. Attorneys legal work however consist entirely of representing local inventors before the United States Patent and Trademark office in Washington DC either by correspondence or by traveling to appear there in patent proceedings. Irrelevant federal statute states that non lawyers may represent patent applicants before the USPTO. The attorney does no other legal work for clients--if clients need representation for family law matters, employment matters, incorporating businesses, or personal injury suits, attorney refers them to outside counsel. All of attorneys clients however are located in the state where the firm has its office and attorney is unlicensed there. Is attorney subject to discipline?
yes, because attorney is regularly engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in that state.
yes, because all of the clients reside in a state where attorney is unlicensed.
no, because attorney is providing services authorized by federal law which preempts state licensing requirements.
no, because attorney has specialized in a single area of law and refers all other matters to outside counsel.
An attorney lives in the border town of Nashua, New Hampshire which is a 45 minute drive from Boston MA. The attorney took the Massachusetts bar exam and passed it and now seeks admission to the bar in that state as she has a job offer from a firm in Boston and plans to commute there every day from her home in New Hampshire. The State Bar of Massachusetts has a rule that lawyers must be residents of the state in order to obtain a license to practice law there on a regular basis, so it declines her application to the bar. When the attorney challenges this decision in federal court, will she prevail?
yes, because the residency requirement violates the privileges and immunity's clause of the US constitution.
yes, because the residency requirement violates the equal protection clause of the US constitution.
no, because state courts have inherent authority to regulate the lawyers who practice in that state.
no, because as an out-of-state resident, she lacks standing to challenge a regulation in that state.
An attorney has a license to practice in the state in which his firm operates. He hires as an associate a law school friend who does not have a license in the state who but holds a license to practice in a neighboring state with similar laws and precedents. The attorney gives the associate attorney only simple cases that require mostly scrivener’s work (paperwork) for the clients but he allows the associate to interview clients and to prepare and file client forms and paperwork. About once a week the attorney checks with the associate and asks how his work is going and the associate always says everything is fine and occasionally asks questions about local laws or rules. Any clients whose matters seem to require actual litigation go to the attorney; the associate handles only non litigation forms and filings for the clients. Is the attorney subject to discipline for this arrangement?
No, because the associate handles only non litigation matters like forms an filings for the clients.
No, because the associate is a duly licensed attorney in a neighboring state with similar laws.
Yes, because it is inappropriate for lawyers to hire friends from law school as an associate rather than interviewing and hiring the most qualified available candidate.
yes, because the attorney is assisting another person in the unlicensed practice of law in his jurisdiction.
An attorney is a notorious personal injury lawyer widely feared by defendant corporations an insurers who must defend claims. The attorney reaches 1 exceptionally favorable settlement for his client, a structured settlement paying several hundred million dollars over the period of five years. The defendant has lost cases to the attorney on several occasions and wants to avoid dealing with him in the future. The defendant demands, as a condition of settlement, that the attorney will not represent any other clients in the future in tort actions related to this defendant or even to similar businesses in that jurisdiction. The attorneys contingent fee will be large enough for him to retire comfortably to a private tropical island and never need to work again, so he is amenable to this condition of the settlement. Is the attorney subject discipline for this agreement?
no, because the attorney is in a position to retire so this is more like selling a practice to the opposing party than restricting the lawyers ability to continue practicing law.
No, because the condition is part of a settlement in a case where the lawyer is receiving a contingent fee so this is not a genuine restriction on the right to practice law.
Yes, because it is improper to have a settlement arrangement that secures payment over such a long period.
Yes, the agreement violates the rules but the attorney probably does not care about being subject to discipline if he plans to leave the practice of law.
An attorney owns his own firm in a small town and hires an associate as a junior lawyer to help with the growing caseload. The employment agreement stipulates that the associate cannot practice law in that small town after leaving the attorneys firm. Which of the following is true regarding this arrangement?
Neither the attorney nor the associate are subject to discipline for such an agreement.
The attorney is subject to discipline for requiring this as a condition of employment, but the associate is not subject to discipline because his employer imposed the condition upon him.
Both the attorney and the associate are subject to discipline for such an agreement.
The associate is subject to discipline for accepting employment in a firm under such a condition but the attorney is not subject to discipline because the associate is the one who will have to execute the provision after leaving the firm.
An attorney specializes in estate planning. Besides being a lawyer, she is a certified public accountant (CPA). One of her clients hires her to prepare a will and handle the planning for a complex estate, which will involve creating two Charitable Trusts and other maneuvers for avoiding hefty estate taxes. The estate planning in this case involves some transfers to create the trusts in the current calendar year, which will be reportable on the current year tax returns. The client asks the attorney to prepare her tax returns for the current year given that the attorney is handling all the estate planning and already has all the documentation about the finances an assets of client. The attorney agrees to prepare the returns as a CPA and she creates a separate retainer agreement with the client for the preparation of the tax returns, one that complies with all IRS requirements for tax preparers and stipulates this retainer shall be for accounting work not legal services. Five years later, the same client runs for Congress and during a contentious campaign a Reporter asks the attorney how much the client paid in taxes in the year that the attorney prepared the tax returns. The attorney answers the question in detail. The client complains that this constitutes a breach of lawyer confidentiality but the attorney defends her actions by explaining that the amount of taxes paid that year was information derived solely from her work as a CPA, under a separate retainer with the due disclosures and not as a lawyer. Who is correct here--the client, or the attorney?
The client is correct because the circumstances were such that the non legal accounting services were not distinct from the legal services attorney was providing at the time.
the client is correct because lawyers have a duty of confidentiality toward clients even for information acquired outside the legal representation of the client.
the attorney is correct because the client is obviously a sophisticated individual with a complex estate, as long as the separate retainer provided adequate disclosure that the rules of professional conduct for lawyers would not apply to the preparation of the tax returns.
the attorney is correct because candidates have a duty to disclose how much they pay in taxes.
An attorney knew about another lawyer's involvement in an illegal money laundering enterprise, although the money laundering was unrelated to the other lawyers law practice or representation of clients. Eventually, when federal law enforcement officials bring criminal charges against the other lawyer, who is part of another firm, the first attorney's awareness of the situation becomes evident. Could the attorney who knew of the wrongdoing and ignored it be subject to discipline?
yes, because it is a violation of the rules of professional conduct to fail to report serious fraud or criminal activity by another lawyer.
yes, because the lawyer who knew and did nothing was an accomplice after the fact.
no, because the attorney had no duty to report misconduct of lawyers in other firms.
no, because the attorney could have put himself in danger by reporting an organized crime effort and lawyers do not have to report misconduct when doing so might expose the reporting lawyer to retaliation by criminal organizations.
An attorney suspects that another lawyer in his firm has violated the rules of professional conduct and a rather serious manner but has no first hand knowledge of the situation--his suspicion rests on the fact that the other lawyer seems to be acting paranoid an evasive and a number of strange coincidences have occurred in his cases. Does the attorney who suspects something seriously wrong is afoot have a duty to report the other lawyer to the State Bar disciplinary authority?
yes, but he must make an anonymous complaint to the State Bar.
yes, because a lawyer who knows of a violation of the rules that raises serious questions about the other attorney's honesty must report it to the state disciplinary authority.
no, because he does not have actual knowledge of the violation.
no, because lawyers do not have to report violations by other attorneys at their own firm which would create internal divisions and mistrust between partners.
An attorney works at a large firm and sees almost daily violations or potential violations of the rules of professional conduct, though nearly all of them are minor and caused no harm or injury to the clients, third parties, or anyone else. For example, some lawyers represent Co defendants in cases where conflicts could arise at some point in the litigation, though the cases always seemed to settle before any such scenarios develop. In other instances, certain lawyers seem to do minimal research on their cases or sometimes neglect client matters for weeks at a time, but again there has not been a case that was particularly serious. Does the attorney have a duty to report these violations to the state disciplinary authority?
Yes, because a lawyer who knows of a violation of the rules that raises serious questions about the other attorney's honesty must report it to the state disciplinary authority.
Yes, but he must make an anonymous complaint to the State Bar.
No, because he does not have actual knowledge of the violation.
No, because a lawyer must report only those offenses that a self regulating profession must vigorously endeavored to prevent; if a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the rules, the failure to report any violation would itself be a professional offense.
An attorney has been practicing for five years, but on her application to the bar five years earlier, she had stated that she had attended a particular private high school, when in fact she had attended a public high school. An unhappy client recently filed a grievance against the attorney, which was frivolous, but the state disciplinary authority had to conduct a routine, preliminary inquiry into the matter in order to make a determination that the complaint merited dismissal. The disciplinary board member assigned to the case had attended the elite private high school from which the attorney claimed to have graduated comma and made a mental note of the attorneys high school when he did a cursory review of her bar admission files. He thought it was strange that he had never seen nor heard her name at any alumni or any reunion functions, as they had supposedly graduated the same year and the classes were small. On a hunch comma the board member checked the alumni lists for the school and discovered that the attorney had lied on her application to the bar five years earlier. When asked about the issue the attorney said she could not be subject to discipline now for the misstatement she made several years ago, and that the board lacked jurisdiction because it was unrelated to the current grievance complaint. Is she correct?
Yes, because she has been practicing now for five years and has demonstrated her character and fitness to practice law making the application queries moot.
Yes, because it was improper for the board member to conduct a self initiated investigation into her high school attendance merely because he graduated from the same high school that the attorney listed on her original bar application.
No, because the fact that she lied about her high school makes it likely that the current client complaint has merit as well.
No, because if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted.
An attorney obtained admission to the bar in New York and practiced there for two years. She worked for big firm which has offices in five States and a few locations overseas. After her two years in the New York office the firm transferred her to its office in San Diego CA. The attorney then applied for admission to the California bar under a reciprocity arrangement, in the State Bar admitted her without making her retake the bar exam. After practicing in California for three years, somehow the New York State Bar learned that the attorney had made false statements on her original bar application about misdemeanor arrests during college. The New York bar informed the California state disciplinary authority about this problem and the California State Bar commenced disciplinary proceedings against the attorney in California. Can the attorney be subject to discipline in California for false statements made on a bar application in another state?
Yes, because the states depend on each other to help enforce their own attorney disciplinary rules and California therefore has a legal duty to enforce disciplinary rules from New York.
Yes, because if a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission it may be relevant in a subsequent admission application or disciplinary proceeding elsewhere.
No, because the alleged misconduct occured on a bar application in a non-contiguous state so California has no jurisdiction over the matter.
No, because the fact that the attorney has now practiced for five years means that the estoppel doctrine prevents a State Bar from revisiting her original bar application.
A Criminal Court found that lawyer had engaged in domestic violence against his partner and convicted the lawyer of misdemeanor level battery for which he served a six month term of probation. Could the attorney be subject to professional discipline as well?
Yes, because any illegal activity by a lawyer constitutes professional misconduct.
No, because crimes of violence have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law.
Yes, because crimes of violence indicate a lack of the character traits required for law practice.
No, because only felonies (not misdemeanors) can constitute professional misconduct.
An attorney faced criminal sanctions for having over two thousand unpaid traffic and parking tickets, and several instances of failure to appear for jury duty. Could the attorney be subject to professional discipline for these minor offenses?
Yes, because any illegal activity by a lawyer constitutes professional misconduct.
Yes, because a pattern of repeated offenses even ones of minor significance one considered separately can indicate indifference to legal obligation.
No, because traffic violations or neglecting jury duty would have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law.
No, because these activities do not arise from or pertained the attorneys representation of a client.
An attorney had a license to practice law in two jurisdictions--his home state where he lived and had his main office, and a neighboring state where he represented several clients each year. The attorney committed serious professional misconduct in his home state, and received a public reprimand from the state disciplinary authorities. All of the conduct took place in his home state, the client resided in the state, and the representation took place entirely within his home state. The lawyer's conduct would have violated the rules in either of the jurisdictions where he had a license to practice law, because it involved Comingling client funds with his own money, and the states had nearly identical rules concerning this activity. After the attorney received a public reprimand in his home state where the misconduct occurred, the State Bar disciplinary authority in the neighboring state (where he also practiced) then commenced disciplinary proceedings against him as well. Ultimately, the neighboring State Bar suspended his license for six months in that state, a much more severe sanction than the public reprimand he received in his home state, where the misconduct actually occurred. The attorney claims that the neighboring State Bar has no jurisdiction over conduct that occurred entirely outside of the state. He also objects that the second punishment raises double jeopardy concerns. Is this attorney correct?
Yes, because even in cases where a second state can administer discipline over the same conduct double jeopardy rules prevent the second tribunal from imposing a more severe sanction than the first tribunal already imposed on the lawyer.
Yes, because a lawyer cannot be subject to the disciplinary authority of two jurisdictions for the same conduct if it occurred entirely within one state.
No, because a lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of two jurisdictions for the same conduct and may receive different sanctions in each state.
No, because choice of law rules require that each state impose the same sanction.
A state legislature enacted a statute governing the licensing of attorneys and discipline for practitioners. The preamble to the statute asserts “field preemption” over the regulation of lawyers in that jurisdiction, thereby abolishing all prior rules and codes of the State Bar. A lawyer comes under discipline under the new law and contests the legal validity of the enactment itself. What is the result?
The court will hold the law invalid because the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the attorneys who practice in its courts.
The court will reject the lawyer's claim about the laws invalidity and will uphold the sanction.
The court will refuse to hear the case because it now lacks jurisdiction over the matter.
The court will certify a question to the legislature to seek its decision in the matter.
A small firm employs several associates who work under the supervision of the partners, as well as three clerical staff. The most recently hired associate has a complicated situation with his license to practice law. The associate graduated from an accredited law school, successfully passed the state bar exam, and applied for admission to the bar, believing he had met all the eligibility requirements. He had no criminal record or history of academic misconduct, or any other problems meeting the traditional character and fitness requirements. The State Bar approved his application and he attended his swearing in ceremony. The state legislature, however, had recently passed a statute creating the option of a legislative veto for lawyers seeking admission to practice law in the state. The sponsors of the enactment had stated that its purpose was to prevent the grown children of illegal immigrants from becoming lawyers, even though the bar applicant might be a United States citizen “just because they happen to be born here.” This so see it was born in Arizona one month after his parents had moved here illegally from a country in Central America. A staff member of the relevant legislative committee flagged the associates name from a list of recent bar licensees, along with three others in his situation. During a special session of the legislature, the state statute exercising the equivalent of a legislative veto, narrowly passed a special act that permanently disbarred the associate and the others for the sole reason that their parents were illegal aliens. The associate received official notice of his disbarment from the office of legislative counsel, not from the State Bar. This occurred one week after the associate's swearing in ceremony by the State Bar, and two days after he started working at the firm. A notice of the disbarment appeared in the next issue of the State Journal, but most of the firm was unaware of the situation, except for one managing partner in whom the associate had confided. Could the partners at the firm be subject to discipline for employing the associate as an attorney, despite challenging any such discipline in court?
Yes, because they have employed an associate who engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Yes, but only the managing partner, who had actual knowledge that the associate was no longer licensed to practice law, would be subject to discipline.
No, because the associate was duly licensed at the time that the firm hired him, and the partners cannot be responsible for an unforeseeable event that occurred afterward, such as the associates disbarment by a special act of the legislature.
No, because the courts have inherent power to regulate the legal profession, and the legislature's action could not survive a court challenge.
An attorney is dating a woman whose sister works as a nurse in a hospital emergency room. The attorney gives the nurse, his girlfriend sister, a stack of business cards and law firm brochures, and offers to pay her $200 for any clients who hire him because of her referrals, with the understanding that she will not refer patients to any other lawyers. The nurse recommends several patients per month to the attorney for representation in personal injury claims, and one or two per month actually hired the attorney to represent them. Is such an arrangement proper?
Yes, because the nurse is closely related to the attorney, given that the attorney is dating her sister.
Yes, because the attorney is not paying the nurse on a contingent fee basis.
No, because a lawyer should not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer services, with certain exceptions not applicable here.
No, because the fact that the attorney is dating her sister creates a conflict of interest if the nurse refers clients to the attorney.
An attorney made an informal agreement with a physician that they would refer clients to each other when the situation seemed appropriate. They did not pay each other any money for referrals, but the relationship was explicitly reciprocal--the attorney referred patients who needed medical examinations to the physician, and when the physician had patients needing legal representation, he referred them to the attorney. The relationship was not explicitly exclusive--each was free to refer clients to others--but it happened that neither had similar reciprocal relationships with anyone else. They always informed their clients when making such referrals that they had a reciprocal relationship. Is such an arrangement proper?
Yes, a lawyer married agree to refer clients to another lawyer or a non lawyer professional, in return for the undertaking of that person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer, as long as clients are aware and the relationship is not exclusive.
Yes, because the agreement is informal, not a written contract.
No, because a lawyer may not agree to refer clients to another lawyer or a non lawyer professional, in return for the undertaking of that person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer.
No, because the relationship described here is de facto exclusive, even if they have not agreed specifically to keep their relationship exclusive.
